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Researchers have long used federal court data assembled by the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (AO) and the Federal Judi- 
cial Center (FJC). The data include information about every case 
filed in federal district court and every appeal filed in the twelve non- 
specialized federal appellate courts.' Much research using the A 0  
data spans subject matter areas, and includes articles on appeal^,^ 
caseloads and case-processing t i r n e ~ , ~  outcome^,^ the relation be- case 
1 See INTEK-UNI\~ERSI-IY FOR C O U K ~CONSOKTIUM POL.& SOC.RIGS., FEDERAL CASES: 
INTEGRATEDDATA~ A S E ,2001, ICPSR Study No. 3415 (2002) [hereinafter ICPSR 
34151; INTER-UNIVEKSITY CONSOK~IUMFOR POL.& SOC. KES., FEDERAI.. COURT CASES: 
I ~ r ~ ; . c ; l w r e ~DATA BASE, '1970-2000, ICPSR Study No. 8429 (2001) [hereinafter ICPSR 
84291. For additional information on the federal courts' recordkeeping, see TECH. 
TKAINING DIV., ADMIN. REPORII.& SUPI'OK-r OFF.OF TI-IE U.S. CTS., ClVlL S .~K~IS.~ICAL 
ING GUIDE Uuly 1999) [hereinafter CIV. STAT. REPORTING GUIDE] (on file with au- 
thors); I1 ADMIN. OFF. OF 1-1-IE U.S. CTS., GUIDE TO POLICIESJUDICIARY AND 
PKO(.:EDURES,at 11-18 to -28 (1985) (district courts) (on file with authors); 1 l ADMIN. 
OFF.OF THE U.S. C-rs., S-~A-~IS~IC:S 7-43MANUAL (1989) (courts of appeals) (on file 
with authors). 
2 Kg., Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: ?'he 7Xreat to 
the Function of Revirrtu and the National 12aw, 82 HAKV. L. REV. 542 (1969); Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias i n  the Fe(lera1 Appellate Courts, 84 
J u o l c ~ r u ~ e  or128 (2000); Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Af)pealfi.om~/ury 
./u,(lge 7iial: I)</endant.s'Advantuge, 3 AM.1,.& ECON. REV. 125 (2001 ) [hereinaf'ter C l e ~  
lnont & Eisenberg, Defmdants' A l a n g e ] ;  Kevin M .  Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 
Plainriphobic~ i n  tile Appellate Courts: Civil Rigl~ls Really Do D i p Jrom Negotiable Instru- 
ments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 [hereinafter Clermont & Eisenberg, Plaintipl~obia]; 
Richard A. Posner, Will the Fe(lera1 C ~ I L ~ ~ S  Su,mive Until 1984? A n  Essay on of Al~j~crals 
Delqation a d  Specialization oftlte Judicial Function, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 761 (1983); Todd 
E. Thompson, Increasing UniJbnnity (rnd Cnj~acity i n  the Federal Af~pellr~te System, 11 HAS 
TINCS CONST. L.Q. 457, 459 (1984); Juclah 1. Labovitz, Note, 131,Ranc Procedure in the 
I+derul Cou,rts ofApt~e(iIr, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 220, 220 n.3 (1962). 
3 l<.g.,David S. Clark, A(lj~~N'icutio.nto Advzinistration: A Strrtisticr~l Analysis ofFederal 
Ilisln'ct Courts i n  the Twmtietli Centz~ry, 55 S. CAL. L. REV.65 (1981); Kuo-Chang Huang, 
Ma,ndatory Disclosure: A Controriersial Device with No Iyfects, 21 PACE L. REV. 203, 245-68 
(2000);Judith Resnik, Manw~gen'nlJ~~dges, L. KEV. 374, 396 n.85 (1982); Hans 96 HARV. 
Zeisel & Thomas Callahan, S1)lit 7iz'als and 7i'nze Saving: A Statistic(1.1 Analysis, 76 HARV. 
L. Rev. 1606 (1963). 
4 I<.&, Jason Scott Johnston &Joel Waldfogel, Does l@eat Play Elicit Cooperation? 
I<vi(lence frmn Federal Civil Litigation, 31 J .  LEGAL STUD. 39 (2002); Daniel Kessler, 
Thomas Mei tes & Geoffrey Miller, I<xplain.ing Der~iations Jrmn tile Fity-l'ercent Rule: A 
Multimodal Approach to the Selection ofCase.s for Litigation, 25 J .  LEGALSTUD. 233, 248-57 
(1 996) ; Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Jnfonnation and Divergent Expectations 
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tween demographics and case outcomes,~lass actions," diversity juris- 
diction,' and litigation genera l l~ .~  Other research using the A 0  data 
covers particular subject matter areas, such as inmate cases," contract 
cases,") corporate litigation,' antitrust litigation,'"atent litigation,':+ 
employment litigation,I4 constitutional tort litigation,'Qnd products 
Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451 (1998); Joel Waldfogel, The Selection Hypothe- 
sis and the Relationship Between Trial nnd Plaintijf Victory, 103 J. POL. ECON. 229 (1995). 
5 See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Trial Outcomes and Demogruphics: Is 
There a Bronx Effect?, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1839 (2002); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabar- 
rok, Race, Poverty, and American Tort Awards: Evidence from Three Data Sets, 32 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 27 (2003). 
6 See Arthur R. Miller, Comment, Of h n k e n s t e i n  Monsters and Shining Knights: 
Myth, Reality, and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARV. L. REV. 664,691-92 (1979); Note, 
Developments i n  the Laru: Class Actions, 89 HAKV. L. REV. 1318, 1325 n.30 (1976). 
7 See Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, T l ~ eliffect of Electoral Institutions on Tmt  
Awards, 4 AM.L & ECON. REV. 341 (2002); David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdic- 
tion: A Suruey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 31 7 (1977). 
8 f ig . ,  Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Litigution halities, 88 CORNELL 
L. REV. 119 (2002); Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement: 
A n  Empirical ApProach, 71 REV. ECON.& STAT. 189 (1989) [hereinafter Fournier & 
Zuehlke, Litigation and Settlement]; Gary M. Fournier & Thomas W. Zuehlke, 7'he Tim- 
ing of Out-ofcourt Settlements, 27 RAND J. ECON. 310 (1996) [hereinafter Fournier & 
Zuehlke, Out-@-Court Settlements]; Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: 
What We Know and Don't Know ((md Think We Knoru) About Our Allegedly Contentious and 
1,itigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4, 44 (1983); Marc Galanter, ?'he Lije and Times of the 
Big Six; Or, the Federal Cou.rts Since the Good Old Days, 1988 WIS. L. REV.92 1. 
9 Kg.,  Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 897, 940-65 (1984); Margo 
Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555 (2003); David L. Shapiro, Fedma1 
Habeas Coqus: A Study i n  Masstich7uetts, 87 HAKV. L. REV. 321, 332, 336 (1973); William 
Bennett Turner, When Prisonms Sue: A Stuoy of Prisoner Section 1983 Suits i n  the Federal 
Courts, 92 ~ K V .  L. REV. 610 (1979); Note, State Court Withdr(~wal@m Habeas Corpus, 
114 U. PA. L. REV. 1081, 1096 n.85 (1966). 
10 See Marc Galanter, Contract in Court; or Almost E v q t h i n g  You. May or May Not 
Want To Know About Contract Litigution, 2001 WE. L. REV. 577. 
11 E.g., Terence Dunworth &Joel Rogers, Co~rrratiotzs i n  Court: Big Business Litiga- 
tion i n  U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 497 (1996). 
12 See Note, Nolo Plens i n  Antitrust Crues, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1475, 1478 & 11.25 
(1966). 
13 See Gai~ri Prakash-Canjels, Tren,dc i n  Patent Cases: 1990-2000, 41 IDEA 283 
(2001). 
14 See Gregory Todd Jones, Note, Tesling for Stn~ctural Ch(~nge i n  Legal Doctrine: An, 
l<rnf)iricnl Decision to Litigate l<niployment Disputes !s Decade (gter the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 
18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 997 (2002). 
15 E.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, 'I'he Rcality of Constitutional Tort 
Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 641 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality]; 
Stewart J. Schwab & Theodore Eisenberg, 1;xplainin.g Constitutional Tort Litigation: 7'he 
Influence of the Attolnqr I;ees Stntute and the Govannlent mDejendant, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 
719 (1988). 
1458 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  [VOL. 78:5 
liability cases.lVhese varied uses of the A 0  database have led to it 
being called "by far the most prominent" database used by legal re- 
searchers for statistical analysis of case outcomes.17 
For many years researchers relied on the data as published in the 
Annual Reports of the A 0  DirectorI8 or on specific inquiries answered 
by the A 0  staff. In recent years, the FJC has made the data available 
in electronic form through the Inter-university Consortium for Politi- 
cal and Social Research.IVhis easier access to the data, together with 
increasing use of computers and sophisticated statistical software pro- 
grams, forecasts even greater future use of the A 0  data. 
Like many large data sets,"-he A 0  data are not completely accu- 
rate. Some reports exist relating to the A 0  data's reliability,Z1 but no 
- systematic study of the AO's non-bankruptcy data has been published. 
In the course of a substantive study of federal litigation brought by 
prison and jail inmates, one of us began to investigate the nature and 
16 See Theodore Eisenberg &James A. Henderson, Jr., Inside the Quiet Revolution 
in Products Liability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 731 (1992); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Theodore 
Eisenberg, 7ke Quiet Revolution in Products 1,iability: An  Empirical Study of legal Change, 
37 UCLA L. REV. 479 (1990). 
17 Frank B. Cross, Comflamtiue Judicial Databmes, 83JUDICATURE 248, 248 (2000). 
18 See, e.g., ADMIN. OF THE UNITEDOFF.O F  THE U.S. C.I.S., JUD JUDICIAL BUSINESS 
STATESCOURTS (2001) (published annually). 
19 See, e.6, ICPSR 8429, supra note 1; ICPSR 3415, supra note 1 .  For a guide to 
merging the Internet-available data into one large database, see Margo Schlanger, 
Inmate Litigation Technical Appendix, at http://wv.law.harvard.edu/faculty/ 
schlanger/projects/. 
20 See Utah v. Evans, 122 S. Ct. 2191,2195 (2002) (noting the existence of gaps in 
the census data and of conflicts in the data); David Cantor & Lawrence E. Cohen, 
Comparing Measures of Homicide Trenh: Methodological and Substantive DifSmces in the 
Vital Statistics of U n i f m  Crime Report Time Series (1933-1975), 9 Soc. SCI. RES. 121, 
143-44 (1980) (questioning the accuracy of homicide data collected and reported by 
the FBI and the National Center for Health Statistics); Michael G. Maxfield, Circum-
stances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 671, 
675-81 (1989) (criticizing the data classification methods used in supplementary 
homicide reports data). 
21 See TI-IOMAS E.I. AL., EMPIRICAL OF CLASSACTIONSI N  FOURE. WILI~C:INC. STUDY 
FEDEKAL Cou~71.s: REPORT COMMIITEE RULESDISTRICT FINAL .ro THE ADVISORY ON CIVIL 
197-200 (1996) (reporting inaccuracy of class action variable). See also Schlanger, 
supra note 9, at 1699-1704; sources cited infra notes 46, 47, 55. On the related 
(though separate and quite different) A 0  bankruptcy data, see DAVID T. STANLEY & 
MARJORIE BANKRUPTCY: PROCESS,REFORM170 (1971) (noting the dif- GIKTI-I, PROBLEM, 
ficulty the A 0  has in getting bankruptcy officials to submit accurate data); Jennifer 
Connors Frasier, Caught in a Cycle of Neglect: The Accuracy of Rankn~ptcy Statislics, 101 
COM.L.J. 307 (1996) (reporting on systematic analysis of A 0  bankruptcy statistics); 
'and Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren &Jay Lawrence Westbrook, 7Re Use of Empir- 
icalllata in Formuhtin.gB~nnkmptq Policy, LAW 8c. CONTEMP. Spring 1987, at 195, ROBS., 
222-24 (criticizing the accuracy and utility of A 0  bankruptcy data). 
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rate of errors, exploiting a technological innovation in federal court 
records: the availability of docket sheets over the Internet via the fed- 
eral judiciary's Public Access to Court Electronic Records project 
(PACER).22 This Article follows a similar method to begin more com- 
prehensively the process of assessing the A 0  data's reliability. (Rela- 
tively little is known about the accuracy of other major law-related 
data sets although it is clear that another source of information about 
thousands of cases, jury verdict reporters, vary in their accuracy.)'" 
In the large majority of districts,Z4 PACER allows public Internet- 
based access to docket sheets recorded since 1993; in some districts 
other case materials are also available. To test the A 0  data's reliabil- 
ity, we compare the characteristics of cases as coded in the A 0  data 
with what we believe to be the more accurate information recorded by 
clerks on individual case docket sheets, as obtained through the 
PACER system.Z5 Even though the court personnel who update case 
dockets are frequently the very people responsible for the A 0  data 
collection (and indeed, such personnel may often fill in many, though 
not all, of the A 0  variables on the basis of the docket sheet itself),26 
the information on the docket sheets is likely to be more reliable be- 
cause it is entered in narrative form and therefore without coding is- 
sues and as litigation events occur rather than retrospectively, and 
because maintenance of dockets (unlike data entry for A 0  statistical 
purposes) is a core function of court clerks' office personnel. 
This study looks at two large categories of cases, torts and inmate 
civil rights, and separates two aspects of case outcomes: which party 
22 Schlanger, supra note 9, at 1601. 
23 For discussion of verdict reporters' reliability and relevant references, see The- 
odore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87 COR- 
NELL  L. REV. 743, 747-48, 748 11.17 (2002). 
24 Of the ninety-four federal district courts, thirteen did not have Internet-accessi- 
ble records at the time we gathered data for this study. They were the Southern Dis- 
trict of New York, Eastern District of North Carolina, Western District of Kentucky, 
Southern District of Indiana, Western District of Arkansas, District of Alaska, District 
of Idaho, District of Montana, District of Nevada, District of New Mexico, Eastern 
District of Oklahoma, District of the Northern Mariana Islands, and the District for 
the Virgin Islands. These districts accounted for approximately 11% of the federal 
district court docket terminated in 2000. Because several of these districts have re- 
cently adopted the PACER system, the currently unavailable districts see only 6% of 
the federal district court docket (again, using 2000 terminations). 
25 Except with respect to some pleadings prior to the start-date of the system 
(usually 1993), the PACER-available dockets are generally not summaries derived 
from some other, lower-tech docketing system, but rather are simply the case dockets, 
which are now maintained electronically. 
26 Telephone Interview by Margo Schlanger with Virginia Hurley, Operations 
Manager, U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts (Jan. 14, 2003). 
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obtained judgment and the amount of the judgment when plaintiffs 
prevailed. With respect to the coding for the party obtaining judg- 
ment, we find that the A 0  data are very accurate when they report a 
judgment for plaintiff or defendant, except in cases in which judg- 
ment is reported for plaintiff but damages are reported as zero. As to 
this anomalous category (which is far more significant in the inmate 
sample than in the torts sample), defendants are frequently the actual 
victors in the inmate cases. In addition, when the data report a judg- 
ment for "both" parties (a characterization that is ambiguous even as a 
matter of theory), the actual victor is nearly always the plaintiff. Be- 
cause such cases are quite infrequent, this conclusion is premised on 
relatively few observations and merits further testing. 
With respect to award amounts, we find that the unmodified A 0  
data are more error prone, but that the data remain usable for many 
research purposes. While they systematically overstate the mean 
award, the data apparently yield a more accurate estimate as to me- 
dian awards. Moreover, researchers and policymakers interested in 
more precise estimates of mean and median awards have two reasona- 
bly efficient options available. First, as described below, they can ex- 
clude two easily-identified classes of awards with self-evidently suspect 
values entered in the A 0  data. Second, using PACER or courthouse 
records, they can ascertain the true award only in the suspect cases 
without having to research the mass of cases. Either technique seems 
to provide reasonable estimates of the median award. The second 
technique may provide a reasonable estimate of the mean award, at 
least for some case categories. 
Concern about the remaining degree of error depends on the 
case category being studied and on the research question being asked. 
The second technique produces accurate mean and median estimates 
in our torts sample. For our inmate cases, however, it proves less help- 
ful, probably because of the small size of awards in inmate cases. Even 
in inmate cases, however, the suggested techniques produce estimates 
of the median award that are within a few thousand dollars of the true 
award. In short, however, for researchers interested in understanding 
the central tendencies of award amounts by case category, the A 0  
data can provide usable information. We offer no conclusion on 
whether the data can sustain more complex modeling techniques in 
which damages amounts are linked to other docket and district 
features." 
Our conclusions differ notably from those based on the only 
other published systematic inquiry into A 0  federal court data. The 
27 See i n . n  text accompanying notes 80-82. 
20031 R E L I A B I L I T Y  O F  A 0  I > A l ' A B A S E  1461 
A 0  gathers bankruptcy case data using a system quite like the district 
court database we discuss here. And there has been some sustained 
examination of the accuracy of that bankruptcy data system-exami- 
nation that concluded that the data are so "error riddeny'*" as to "im- 
poverish the bankruptcy debate."2Y Indeed, leading empiricist 
scholars in the bankruptcy field have concluded that the AO's bank- 
ruptcy "data are utterly inadequate for policy purposes."") Why, you 
may wonder, the difference? The most obvious answers lie both in the 
details of how the A 0  bankruptcy data differ from the A 0  district 
court data, and in the need for precision. On the first issue, the bank- 
ruptcy data about which the above scholars seem especially concerned 
relate to filingsrather than outcomes-in particular, the "size and na- 
ture of filed cases."" The A 0  data on such matters is entered into the 
computerized data system by court personnel, but the source of the 
information is the "face sheet" filed by debtors. The debtors (or their 
lawyers), it turns out, very frequently misread the form or report their 
assets, liabilities, or the number of their creditors incorrectly for other 
reasons. These incorrect entries by individual debtors and their law- 
yers-non-court personnel-are reportedly the source of the bulk of 
the error in the bankruptcy statistics." The A 0  district court out- 
come data do not suffer from a similar infirmity."Wn the second 
issue-the need for precision-it may be that the kind of research for 
which many scholars (including us) use the AO's district court data is 
28 Frasier, supm note 21, at 308. 
29 Id. 
30 Sullivan et al., supra note 21, at 210. 
31 Frasier, supra note 21, at 309. 
32 Id. at 340-41 ("filer carelessness is the single, most important cause oJ erro~";"ban-
krupcty clerk transcription errors do  not significantly lower accuracy rates" though 
"local data entry practices" do exacerbate the error rate in the "nature of case data."). 
33 In the district court data, the case categorization similarly depends on the 
choice of the filers (if they are not pro se, see tnpu notes 39-40 and accompanying 
text). For some reason, however, it appears to be extremely accurate. See inpa note 
41. We are, nonetheless, inclined to be quite suspicic)us of district court A 0 data that 
depend too heavily on filer accuracy. We would hesitate, for example, to tnist the 
"demand" variable, which purports to record the amount of money in controversy in 
each case. First, the demand variable is intended to be recorded in thousands of 
dollars, like the "award" variable discussed below-but even more problematically, 
because plaintiffs rather than clerks fill in the amount of the demand. Our guess is 
that, as with bankruptcy filings, small-money cases are frequently coded as big-money 
cases as a result. See infra note 58. Second, there is no requirement that plaintiffs fill 
in this variable except in diversity cases, which makes its availability in non-diversity 
cases infrequent, and non-randomly so. Third, because the amount chosen has little 
further bearing on the case, there is correspondingly little reason to think it has much 
meaning. 
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simply less demanding of precise accuracy than the kind of research 
the bankruptcy scholars would like to do with the AO's bankruptcy 
data. The article examining the accuracy of bankruptcy data de- 
scribes 75% to 83% accuracy as "unacceptably low."34 From our per- 
spective, even if the district court data had a similar error rate, that 
description would not necessarily hold. Seventy-five percent accuracy 
may be plenty accurate enough-or very far from it, depending on 
how errors are distributed and the research questi,ons and design. We 
discuss these matters in some depth below. 
Part I of this Article reviews some strengths and weaknesses of the 
A 0  data. Part I1 uses samples of tort and inmate cases to report on 
the A 0  data's accuracy in reporting the party obtaining judgment and 
award levels. It then uses the information revealed about award level 
accuracy to estimate award levels in employment discrimination cases. 
Part I11 discusses the implications of the findings and applies the tech- 
niques developed in Part I1 to estimate the median trial award in all 
large federal case categories and to suggest the magnitude of some 
miscoding problems across case categories. 
The A 0  database was designed not for research into civil justice, 
litigation theory, or any substantive area of law but for court adminis- 
tration, a purpose that helps explain much of what is both good and 
bad about the data.3Wourt personnel who input the data are trained 
centrally by the AO; various quality assurance techniques are used to 
increase consistency and decrease certain kinds of errors." Where a 
variable is useful to track court workload or assign resources, it is fre- 
quently used and, we believe, probably highly reliable." Accordingly, 
one strength of the A 0  data set is its completeness. Unlike any other 
34 Frasier, supra note 21, at 340. 
35 Although it is not our topic here, we, along with all of the scholars we know 
who have worked with the A 0  data, could suggest a number of seemingly easy, even 
trivial, changes in the way variables are gathered or coded that would make the data 
set even more useful for substantive research. But even as they exist, the variables and 
allowed vali~es allow a good deal of useful analysis. 
36 The best guide to the A 0  system for researchers is actually a training docu- 
ment. See CIV.STAT.REPOK~INGGUIDE,supra note 1. It is quite comprehensive and 
explains a number of such techniques. 
37 SeeJay Lawrence Westbrook, Empirical fisearcl~in Consumer Bankruptcy, 80 TEX. 
L. REV.2123, 2152 (2002) (noting that the A 0  gathers "data, it would seem, almost 
entirely with an eye to accountability, workload analysis, and management generally, 
but with little or no attention to what data would be useful to policymakers or 
scholars"). 
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data set covering the federal courts, it purports to cover every case 
filed. And it seems more than likely that this is indeed its coverage. 
Cases get entered into the database on filing, and there is a built-in 
check because they get entered again, on termination. 
Moreover, the most basic code for researchers' use of the A 0  
data-the case category, which identifies cases as pertaining to a speci- 
fied subject matter-appears, from the limited research already done, 
to be highly accurate. (This too is unsurprising, because the A 0  de-
pends on the accuracy of reports on filings by case category code to 
allocate resources among For cases with counseled plain- 
tiffs, the case category in the data set is generally based on the JS-44 
Civil Cover Sheet, which plaintiffs' lawyers are required to fill out si- 
multaneously with filings." The lawyers check off a simple descrip- 
tion of the type of case (unlike in the bankruptcy face-sheet discussed 
above, which requires filers to complete the more complicated-and 
error prone-tasks of filling in amounts and summarizing various fea- 
tures of their cases). Pro se plaintiffs do not typically complete the 
civil cover sheet, and so in pro se cases usually the court clerks seem to 
fill in this variable based on their own understanding of a case's sub- 
ject matter.40 In any event, we are confident that the case codes used 
for tort and inmate cases are not terribly overinclusive, because the 
dockets we examined for this project would have evidenced any such 
errors (subject matter errors were indeed apparent, but in very small 
number^).^' Because we did not audit dockets that were not classified 
by the A 0  data as inmate cases or tort cases, we could not, however, 
detect underinclusiveness in those ~ategories.~' Nonetheless, for re- 
searchers seeking to identify all federal district court cases in a certain 
subject matter category, it is clear that the A 0  database is the easiest, 
and perhaps the most reliable, method of doing so, provided that the 
38 See Federal Judicial Center, New Case Weights for Computing Each District's 
Weighted Filings per Judgeship (1994) (memorandum on file with the authors) (set- 
ting out results of comprehensive "district court time study" used to calculate wor- 
kload measures for district courts based on substantive case categories). 
39 SeeJS-44 Civil Cover Sheet, available at http://~vww.uscourts.gov/forms/JS044. 
pdf. 
40 E.g., Telephone Interview with Virginia Hurley, szrpa note 26. 
41 Of the 176 cases in our inmate samples, two (1.1 5%) were not in fdct inmate 
cases; we did not formally audit this aspect of the tort sample, but we did not notice 
any errors and believe that the error rate is extremely low. 
42 Underinclusiveness was, however, a correspondingly small problem in one 
field study in which researchers read every filed complaint in one district court during 
the study's time period and found only a very few civil rights cases not so character- 
ized in the A 0  data set. Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal I;bundations and 
a n  Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL . REV.482, 524, 535 n.237 (1982). 
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subject matter of interest matches one or a group of the A 0  case 
~ategories.~.? 
The A 0  data include only a fairly small number of other vari- 
ables, each with a limited set of permitted values. They identify the 
case-district, office, docket number, parties. They specify the case's 
timing-filing date and termination date. They elaborate its procedu- 
ral history, including its "source" (e.g., original filing, inter-district 
transfer, remand), jurisdictional basis (e.g., federal government de- 
fendant, federal question, or diversity), procedural progress (the 
point in the litigation life cycle at which the case was terminated). 
And they set out the outcome-the nature of the judgment (e.g., 
money, costs, injunction), the type of disposition (e.g., by settlement, 
dismissal, jury verdict); the victor (plaintiff, defendant, or both), and 
the amount of any damages awarded. In the past few years, new vari- 
ables have addressed whether the parties have counsel and the use of 
magistrate judges and court-annexed arbitration. As in any large and 
longstanding database, a number of the variables have quirks; careful 
use of the available documentation is essential.44 
Overall, both field studies and other data sets confirm the general 
picture of district court litigation suggested by the A 0  data, although 
as already described, bankruptcy scholars have questioned the AO's 
bankruptcy data's reliability,45 and some aspects of the district court 
data have also been challenged."For example, a field study compar- 
ing the characteristics of litigation as suggested by the A 0  data with 
the characteristics suggested by case-by-case inspection of records in 
courthouses confirmed findings based on A 0  data that constitutional 
43 Searching for cases on a given subject-matter seems likely to be more rather 
than less error-prone than the A 0 database, which uses the expertise of litigants and 
court clerks to classify cases. A study of civil rights cases filed in one district court. 
found that analysis of indiviclual complaints by hand-searching for them in court- 
house records missecl approximately 20% of civil rights cases properly identified in 
the A 0  data as civil rights cases. Id. 
44 The most comprehensive codebooks are available as Parts 94 and 57 of ICPSR 
8429, suj~rnnote 1. Sed also id pt. 117; Schlanger, s u j ~ mnote 9, at 1699-1704. 
45 See supra notes 21, 28-34 and accompanying text. 
46 In particular, the class action variable is authoritatively reported to have been 
quite unreliable, at least for a substantial period of time. See WIL.LGING SU$MET AL., 
note 21, at 197-200. In addition, Kimberly Moore has questioned the usefulness and 
reliability of the A 0  data in patent cases. See Kimberly A. Moore, Jzt(Ig~,Juries, and 
Patent Cases-An I:'n2pin'cal Peek Inside tire Black Box, 99 Mlcr-I.L. REV. 365, 381 (2000) 
[hereinal'ter Moore, judges] (discussing limitations of the A 0 data for analysis of pat- 
ent cases); Kimberly A. Moore, Xenophobia in Arnm'ct~n Courts, 9'7 Nw. U .  L. REV. (forth- 
coming 2003) (manuscript at 37, on file with authors) (questioning reliability of A 0  
"judgment-for" data in patent cases). 
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tort plaintiffs fare relatively poorly at trial compared to other plain- 
tiffs, and also obtain significantly fewer money judgments or settle- 
m e n t ~ . ~ 'The field data also confirmed the A 0  data on amounts 
awarded in the sense that both sources suggested that perceptions 
about damages in constitutional tort litigation are o v e r ~ t a t e d . ~ ~  And a 
more recent study began the process of comparing A 0  data with In- 
ternet-accessible dockets, and confirmed that much of the A 0  data is 
consistent with d~ckets .~"  
Other data sets supply additional evidence relating to the A 0  
data's reliability. For example, plaintiffs' rates of prevailing at trial 
appear to be quite consistent across data sets. The A 0  data suggest 
that plaintiffs in medical malpractice and products liability cases have 
low trial win rates relative to plaintiffs in most other classes of tort and 
contract litigation." These low AOdata win rates are consistent with 
win rates in studies of products liability by the RAND Institute for Civil 
Justice studies of litigation, with studies of medical malpractice litiga- 
t i ~ n , ~ '  General Accounting Office data," the National with with 
Center for State Courts data obtained from state court clerks' of- 
fi~es;~%nd with jury verdict reporte~-se5+ 
The A 0  data's reliability for award amounts is less secure.55 It has 
been thought for years that the amounts are questionable, but the 
47 Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, sui~ra note 15, at 680. 
48 Id. at 684. 
49 Schlanger, supm note 9, at 1699-1 704. 
50 Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, 7 i i ( ~ lby ,J?~qorJudge: Transcending 
l?mpiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1137 (1 992). 
51 NEIL VIDMAR, MALPRACTICE THE JURY: CONFRONTING MEDICAL N\ID AMERICAN 
THE MYTHS AROUT INCOMPETENCE, AND DAMAGEJURY DEEP POCKETS, OUTRAGEOUS 
AWAKDS39 (1995) (noting the low win rates at trial for medical malpractice cases). 
52 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING LIABILIIY: AND CASERESOLU-OFF., PRODUCT VEIZI)ICTS 
TION IN FnrE STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 89-99, at 24 (1989). 
53 Kg., CAROL & MARIKA CIVIL CASESJ. DEFRANCES F.X. LITRAS, TRIAL AND VER-
Dins IN LARGE COUN-~IES, OF JUST. STXI.., BULLETIN 1996, i n  BUREAU 1 (Sept. 1999), 
avnilable at l~ttp://wl~w.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ctcvlc96.pdf(last visited Mar. 22, 
2003); CAROL J. DEFRANC:ES JURY AND VERDICJTS.T AL., CNIL CASES I N  LARGE COUNTIES, 
in BUREAUOF JUST. %TAT., REPORTSPECIAL 1 Uuly 1995), available at http://~?vw.ojp. 
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cjcavilc.pdf (Inst visited Mar. 22, 2003). 
54 STEPHEN &JOANNE CIVII. OF REFORMDANIELS MARTIN, JURIES AND THE POLITICS 
82-83 (1995). . 
55 See Theodore Eisenberg, John Goerdt, Brian Ostro~n & David Rottman, Litiga-
tion 0ulcome.s i n  State and Fe(ler(~1 Courts: A Stali.~tzcd Portrait, 19 ~ W T ~ L EU. L. REV. 433, 
439 n.13 (1996) ("[Tlhe federal method of recording awards ]nay result in some 
awards being inflated."); Moore, Judges, suprtl note 46, at 381; Schlanger, supra note 9, 
at 1703; Stewart J. Schwab, Studying Lnbor Laru cmrl Human Hesoz~rces in Rlzode Island, 7 
ROGERWII-LIAMS (2002) (discussing the inaccuracy of award U. L. REV. 384, 394-95 
data in the A 0  database). 
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precise nature and extent of the likely error has not been known. Sev- 
eral of the problems we now explore stem from the decision, made in 
an era of more expensive computer memory and storage space, to 
allow only four digits to record the amount recovered in a civil ac- 
tion." This limitation means that the highest number that can be 
entered in the A 0  database is "9999," so award amounts are supposed 
to be recorded in thousands of dollars. A number of errors have re- 
sulted. First, even without any inputting mistakes, the AO's data de- 
sign allows for award amounts of up to only $9,999,000. Logically, this 
suggests that A 0  reports of award amounts should be understated be- 
cause award amounts in excess of $9,999,000 are deflated." Cutting 
the other way, towards the problem of A 0  over-statement, are the sys- 
tematic errors introduced by the system of recording award amounts 
in thousands of dollars. A $1000 award should be recorded as a "1" in 
the AO's amount field. But court personnel might easily instead re- 
cord the $1000 as "1000," which is intended by the A 0  to be inter- 
preted as an award of $1,000,000." Moreover, the need to round 
actual award figures to thousands creates imprecision, and might even 
mean that small awards are omitted from the system." Finally, and 
unrelated logically, the figure 9999 may also be used by court clerks in 
other ways, such as to indicate missing data. (Many other A 0  vari- 
56 ICPSR 8429,supra note 1. 
57 Eisenberg & Schwab, Reality, supra note 15,at 686 nn.187-88. 
58 The A 0  itself warned in 1995:"Researchers should also be aware that the re- 
quirement that the Demand and Amount Received fields be reported in thousands of 
dollars is sometimes not followed correctly causing the information for those fields to 
be reported inaccurately. Although the problem is known the level of inaccuracy is 
undetermined." ICPSR 8429,supm note 1, pt. 94,at xxi. 
59 In one place in the training manual currently used to instruct court personnel 
on data entry, the A 0  directs that any award under $500 be entered as zero. CIV. 
ST.4-r. REPORTING GUIDE,supra note 1, at D:l. At the same time, however, the com- 
puter system is programmed to produce an error report whenever the "nature of 
judgment" in a plaintiffs' victory is a monetary award but the award entered equals 
zero. Id. at 4:4, 5:l. (Error reports can be overridden, but it seems likely that clerks 
avoid the error report by coding awards between $1 and $499as 1;we have seen many 
such cases, and very few, if any, coded as the AO's manual suggests.) Prior to 1987, 
when the coding system was generally overhauled, the clerks apparently were in-
structed to code any award of less than $1000a3 zero. See ICPSR 8429,suf)ra note 1, 
pt. 94,at 62; id.pt. 57,at 49.We are not sure what the instruction was after 1987but 
before 1999. In any event, interviews together with examination of the 1993 inmate 
data examined here along with a different inmate case sample, from 2000 termina-
tions, demonstrate that court clerks have at least frequently and perhaps consistently 
used "1" to indicate any damages amount from $1 to $1499 since at least 1993. See 
infra Table 7; see nbo Telephone Interview with Virginia Hurley, supra note 26. To us, 
this makes the most substantive sense, because for low-damage cases, what is most 
important to capture is the distinction between some and no damages. 
20031 R E L I A B I L I T Y  OF A 0  D A T A B A S E  1 4 ~ 7  
ables use repeated 9s as special codes.)") The possible confusion gen- 
erated by the four-digit limitation, together with the differing uses of 
9999 in the amount field, make it difficult to know precisely what to 
make of the amounts reported in the A 0  data. 
To assess errors in the A 0  data set, we compare A 0  data with 
what we believe to be the more reliable docket sheets maintained in 
individual cases. We have not undertaken to travel to a variety of dis- 
trict courts and examine the actual case records (pleadings, orders, 
and so on) or to discuss the cases with the parties or lawyers. Rather, 
we have used PACER to gather electronic docket sheets, and our re- 
search assistants (checked by us) have entered data from the docket 
sheets into a new database.61 The comparisons between the A 0  data 
and the docket sheet data provide a general sense of the magnitude 
and direction of the error in the A 0  data and, we hope, suggest rea- 
sonable approaches to correcting or interpreting the A 0  data. 
A. The Data 
The samples used here are a bit eclectic, reflecting the current 
interests of the co-authors, the availability of docket-sheet data via 
PACER, and limits on time and financial resources. 
We used two different samples. To construct the first sample, we 
began with every tort casem terminated after trial in federal district 
court between January 1and September 30,2000." According to the 
60 See, e.g., ICPSR 8429, supfanote 1,  pt. 94, at 12, 108, 182; id. pt. 57, at 8, 9, 33, 
41-45, 47, 50-53. 
61 The initial coding of the PACER data was done by research assistants without 
any access to the A 0  coding, to avoid biasing the results. For the inmate sample, one 
of us reviewed each entry against the PACER dockets; for the torts sample coding and 
results were reviewed in periodic meetings with our assistants. 
62 The A 0  tort case categories (followed by their code values) are: Airplane Per- 
sonal Injury (310); Airplane Product Liability (315); Assault, Libel, and Slander 
(320);Federal Employers Liability (330);Marine Personal Injury (340);Marine Prod- 
uct Liability (345); Motor Vehicle (350);Motor Vehicle Product tiability (355);Other 
Personal Injury (360); Workers' Comp./Industrial Accident Board (361); Personal 
Injury/Medical Malpractice (362);Personal Injury/Product Liability (365);Asbestos 
Personal Injury Product Liability (368);Other Fraud (370);Truth in Lending (371); 
Other Personal Property Damage (380); and Property Damage Product Liability 
(385). See ICPSR 8429, su,pru note 1 ,  pt. 93. 
63 To be precise, the first sample is every tort case with a "procedural progress" 
code indicating termination after a judge or jury trial, and with a specified victor, 
between January 1 ,  2000 and September 30, 2000. There are an additional eighty-five 
cases without information as to the victor in the A 0  data set. According to their 
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A 0  data, 786 such cases terminated in ninety of the ninety-four fed- 
eral districts. We then excluded 105 cases in the districts that do not 
participate in PACER or in which PACER-based outcomes were other- 
wise unavailable." The total number of cases included in panel A of 
Table 1, below, is thus 681. 
The second sample has two parts. The first part, described in 
panel B-1 of Table 1 below, includes every available inmate civil rights 
caseM terminated in federal district court in fiscal 19936Vn which a 
positive plaintiffs award was recorded in the A 0  data." The A 0  re- 
corded 142 such cases, in fifty-eight district courts; we were able to 
obtain the relevant docket information for 126, from fifty-five courts.68 
The sample's second part, described in panel R2 of Table 1 below, 
explores an oddity in the data: the A 0  data includes 330 inmate cases 
terminated in 1993 in which the .amount of the judgment is Coded as 
zero but the plaintiff is nonetheless c;ded as t.he We con- 
"disposition" codes, these seem largely to be cases that settled or were otherwise dis- 
posed of without a verdict despite a trial having commenced or been completed. But 
it is not in~plausible that some of them were in fact tried to final judgment but for 
some reason the court clerk either did not know or failed to enter the victor. As 
discussed below, we also looked at a separate sample of cases terminated between 
1996 and 1999; these too were tort cases tried to judgment, but limited to diversity 
cases. S P ~infra note 78. 
64 The number of cases omitted from districts not participating in PACER follows 
in parentheses after the name of the applicable district: Southern District of New York 
(39), Eastern District of North Carolina (3), Western District of Kentucky (9),  South- 
ern District of Indiana (3), Western District of Arkansas (6), District of Alaska ( l) ,  
District of Idaho (3), District of Montana (3), District of Nevada (4), District of New 
Mexico (8), and Eastern District of Oklahoma (8). In addition, there were eighteen 
cases from scattered districts for which docket information was not available or in 
which we could not classify the outcome for some other reason. 
65 The inmate case sample includes two A 0  inmate case categories-Prisoner 
Civil Rights (550) and Prison Conditions (555). See Schlanger, supranote 9, at 1699- 
1700, for a discussion of these two categories. 
66 We follow the A 0  and use the federal fiscal year, October 1, 1992 to Septem- 
ber 30, 1993. 
67 For purposes of comparing the inmate sample with the tort sample, note that 
A 0  data indicates that of these 142 cases, only about half involved trials (eighty-one 
are coded with dispositions by jury or judge verdict; eighty-two are coded as resolved 
"during" or "after" jury or judge trials; and seventy-seven meet both criteria). 
68 For the inmate sample, though not the torts sample, we made efforts to obtain 
photocopied docket sheets from court clerks' offices for cases in the districts that do 
not participate in PACEK. In some cases, the clerks' offices were unable to identify 
the docket; in others, the records were unavailable for a variety of reasons. We were 
able to obtain 129 docket sheets; in three of them, the requisite information could 
not be gleaned from the docket sheet. 
69 See supra note 59. 
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structed a 20% random sample of these anomalous case records, at- 
tempting to obtaiq sixty-seven of them from thirty-eight district courts. 
Of these, we were able to actually get docket sheets for forty-seven, 
from twenty-eight courts, and to glean the relevant information from 
all but six.'" 
Given the nature of our samples, a cautionary note is in order. 
We are reasonably confident that our results are valid for the case 
categories and times we study, at least for cases terminated after trial. 
Applying the findings to data sets covering different time periods, dif- 
ferent case categories, and different procedural postures, as we our- 
selves do below, should be done with the samples' limitations in mind. 
B. Win Rates 
Because of differences in the tort and inmate samples, we explore 
accuracy in reporting judgments separately. Table 1 explores the rate 
of agreement between the A 0  coding of whom judgment was entered 
for and what inspection of individual docket sheets reveals. 
Panel A describes the tort cases terminated in 2000 (again, cases 
with AO-reported judgments after trial). Its 313 AO-coded plaintiffs' 
judgments include 253 cases with AO-reported judgments for positive 
amounts and sixty cases in which the judgment was reported as zero, 
even though the plaintiff was reported as the victor. The seventeen 
cases coded with judgments coded for "both plaintiff and defendant" 
include a slightly higher proportion of awards reported as zero-six. 
We include all of these zero-award cases in Table 1, but will address 
them separately in analyses of award amounts. 
Panel B-1 covers the 1993 inmate cases with AO-coded judgments 
for positive amounts; panel B-2 covers those with judgments entered 
by the A 0  as being equal to zero." Because the inmate sample was 
constructed only from cases in which plaintiffs were listed as at least 
70 The cases were selected using a random number generator, and we did not 
resample to make up for unavailable dockets. The poor retrieval rate is not surprising 
because the distribution of anomalous dockets across districts is extremely dispropor- 
tionate; with a very large number (24%) from districts that did not participate in 
PACER, even though those districts accounted for a much smaller proportion (11%) 
of the inmate docket terminated in 1993. The Southern District of New York, in 
particular, reported forty-five of these cases in 1993 (about 14% of the total amount, 
though the district had less than 3% of inmate terminations that year) and is the 
source of much of the anomaly. 
71 The last comprehensive codebook about the database, published in 1997, ex- 
plains that a value of zero means "missing," ICPSR 8429, supra note 1,pt. 94, at 62, 
though this comment is not repeated in the more recent codebooks or in the training 
materials currently used by court clerks. See supra note 59. 
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partial victors, cases reporting judgments for defendants are not in- 
cluded. In addition, the panel B-2 data are drawn from samples. The 
column reporting judgments for plaintiffs is a sample of thirty (of 
185) 1993 inmate trials with judgments for plaintiffs and zero-awards. 
The column reporting judgments for both is a sample of eleven of 145 
cases from 1993 inmate trials with judgments for both and zero-
awards. 
Each panel shows all the sampled permutations of outcomes, 
where the A 0  records a victory for plaintiff, defendant, or both, and 
the PACER-obtained docket can be classified as for plaintiff or defen- 
dant. The shaded squares are those in which our two sources unam- 
biguously agree. 
PANEL A-All available tort trials terminated in 2000 (n  = 681) 
A 0  Judgment for-n (% of cases) 
PACER judgment for: Plaintiff Defendant "Both" 
Plaintiff 313 (46.0%) 10 (1.5%) 17 (2.5%) 
Defendant 3 (0.4%) 337 (49.5%) 1 (0.1%) 
PANEL B-1-All available inmate cases terminated in fiscal year 1993, 
A 0  Award > 0 ( n  = 126) 
A 0  Judgment for-n (% of cases) 
PACER judgment for: Plaintiff Defendant "Both" 
Plain tiff 98 (77.8%) - 24 (19.0%) - . . --
Defendant 4 (3.2%) - 0 
PANEL B-2-Sample of inmate cases terminated in fiscal year 1993, 
A 0  Award = 0 ( n  = 41) 
A 0  Judgment for-n (% of cases) 
PACER judgment for: Plaintiff Defendant "Both" 
Plain tiff 5 (12.2%) - 2 (4.9%) 
Defendant (includes 
voluntary dismissals) 25 (61.0%) - 9 (22.0%) 
SOURC:E:ICPSR 8429, suprn note 1,supplemented by PACER docket research. The 
columns show who won according to the A 0  data; the tows show who won 
according to the Inore accurate Internet-available docket sheets. Shaded squares 
are unambiguously in agreement. 
For the cases in panels A and B-1, the A 0  data prove extremely 
accurate. In panel A, there is agreement with the PACER-based data 
in about 95% of the cases. More than half of the errors, if they are 
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properly even considered errors, arise from the small portion of the 
docket in which the A 0  "judgment for" variable is coded "both," 
meaning that judgment was entered for both plaintiff and defendant. 
Such cases amount to 2.5% of tort trial verdicts in 2000 (or about 5% 
of the tort cases with a full or partial plaintiffs' victory coded). The 
portion of the sample in which victory is recorded for the plaintiff but 
the amount of damages is coded zero do not present a different error 
pattern. The chart does not separate such cases out-but of the sixty, 
just one (1.6%) has an incorrect "judgment-for" code. In panel B-1, 
judgments coded by the A 0  as simple plaintiffs' victories are similarly 
accurate. Nearly all the arguable errors are from the "judgment for" 
equals "both" category, which forms a far larger proportion of the in- 
mate sample than of the torts sample7'--19% of the inmate cases with 
full or partial plaintiffs' victory coded. As in panel A, our reading of 
case dockets in cases so coded in the A 0  data set cannot distinguish 
them from the plain vanilla plaintiffs' j~dgments .~"  
We consider the errors in the "judgment for both" category un- 
surprising, because the intended meaning of "both" is unclear. The 
A 0  apparently does not provide any guidance to court personnel on 
this point.74 Judgment for "both" could mean simply that at least one 
defendant beat liability on at least one count of the complaint. But in 
that case, one would expect a far higher percentage of cases to be so 
coded; it simply cannot be the case that victorious plaintiffs win a vic- 
tory on all counts against all defendants in all but 5% of their judg- 
ments. So if this is the intent, then "judgment for both" is being used 
far too little. Alternative interpretations of "judgment for both" are 
possible-for example, the category would make some sense if ap- 
plied to the small group of cases in which defendants bring counter- 
claims and both the defendant and the plaintiff win on liability. Or 
the code might signal the presence of a pyrrhic plaintiffs victory-a 
case in which the plaintiff technically wins but is awarded only nomi- 
nal damages, or some similar outcome. There is, however, little sign 
72 The twenty-four such cases comprise about 2% of all inmate trial judgments; 
defendants won 900 of the trial judgments in inmate cases terminated in 1993. 
73 Of the seventeen tort cases in 2000 coded asjudgment for both, twelve were in 
the Fifth Circuit. Of the twenty-six sin~ilarly coded inmate cases, twelve were in the 
Eighth Circuit. We have no particular reason to think that this is anything other than 
random variation because when we looked at the entire A 0  data set of judgments 
from 1987 (when the A 0  began using the current coding system) to 2000, we found 
that the only notable outlier in the use of the "both" code was the Ninth Circuit, in 
which district courts disposed of 16% of the cases, but codcd 32% of the "boths." 
74 See CIV.STAT. REPORTING UIDE,supra note 1, at 3:21, D:2 (indicating the code 
for "both plaintiff and defendant" with no further explanation). 
-- 
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in the dockets that any such guess actually matches how the code is 
being used. We are, in short, unable to come up with any consistent 
interpretation of its meaning. In the absence of a theory for what 
"both" should mean, it is hard to say that any use of it is erroneous. 
Still, researchers would be well advised to consider counting cases in 
which "judgment for" equals "both" as plaintiffs' victories, which is 
how nearly all appear to us. 
Panel B-2 presents a far less favorable view of the accuracy of the 
A 0  data. Unlike the results in the torts sample, for inmate cases, in 
the anomalous category of purported plaintifL5' victories with zero (or 
missing)75 damages, the AO's "judgment for" data seem to be too er- 
ror-ridden to be of use. Further exploration is clearly required; we 
offer some preliminary thoughts here. First, in both tort and inmate 
cases, and over the federal docket taken as a whole, the problematic 
coding (that is, the conjunction of judgment for plaintiff and a zero- 
award) seems to be considerably more common in cases terminated 
without trials than in those terminated after trial.7"esearchers look-
ing at trial judgments have somewhat less to be worried about than 
those looking at overall, or just non-trial, outcomes. (Among the por- 
tion of the anomalous cases that had trials, however, the problem re- 
mains; of the forty-one cases in Panel B-1, eleven are coded by the A 0  
as involving trials, of which seven have incorrect "judgment for" 
codes.) Second, the AO's coding in these anomalous cases seems to 
be erroneous in different ways in our two samples. In the torts sam- 
ple, as already stated, there is no problem in the "judgment for" varia- 
ble. Nonetheless, the anomaly does flag somewhat consistent error. 
As Table 2 demonstrates, that error lies in the "award" variable, which 
is correctly coded in only about half of the sixty cases we were able to 
check. (In half the cases, that is, the plaintiff really did win, and with- 
out any damages-these are declaratory judgment cases; in the other 
half, the plaintiff won damages incorrectly coded as not present.) In 
the inmate sample, the error lies in the "judgment for" variable. It 
may be, however, that inmate cases, with their extremely low rate of 
success for plaintiffs, are exceptional in this respect. Because of the 
varying relation between zero-award cases and error patterns, we re- 
port in Part I11 the percentage for each major case category of plain- 
tiffs' awards for an amount of zero.77 
75 See supru note 59. 
76 In all fiscal year 2000 terminations, for example, the anomalous coding was 
present in 27% of cases ended after trial and 37% of other cases in which the A 0 data 
includes ':judgment-for" values. 
77 See infra Part 111, tb1.9. 
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The particular lesson we draw is that the A 0  "judgment for" varia- 
ble is reliably accurate except where something else looks suspi- 
cious-such as, for example, what looks like a large proportion of 
take-nothing plaintiffs' judgments.'* The more general lesson is one 
of cautious optimism. The A 0  data contain their own error checks; 
different variables can be exanlined in relation to each other to assess 
the likelihood of error. So far as we have been able to determine, 
where the values make sense and seem consistent across variables, the 
data are very good indeed. But where there seems to be an anomaly, 
researchers would be foolhardy not to inquire further. And the availa- 
bility of PACER dockets allows such inquiry with relative economy. 
C. Awards 
This section first discusses the accuracy of the A 0  reports of 
awards following trials in tort cases and in inmate cases. It then de- 
votes separate attention to the import of these errors, looking at 
award means and medians within our samples. Finally, it applies the 
techniques developed in assessing tort and inmate case reliability to 
estimate awards in employment discrimination cases. 
1. The Frequency and Nature of Errors in Award Amounts 
Table 2 reports on error rates in the AO-reported awards in our 
2000 tort sample, as checked against dockets available from PACER. 
Different error rates and types are associated with different awards, 
and (as will become evident in the discussion of inmate cases below) 
these associations may vary with the kind of case. 
The table summarizes errors in columns, by error type. Its fourth 
colunln shows that, in our tort trial sample, a plurality of classifiable 
errors relates to rounding. These can be simple arithmetic mistakes; 
where an award is rounded up instead of down, for example. Other 
times rounding errors exist when clerk's office personnel seem to use 
less precision than the system allows; where, for example, a damages 
-
78 We repeated the same analysis on a smaller sample of tort cases terminated 
from 1996 to 1999. Although these were a nonrandom set of cases (limited to dis- 
tricts in the First, Second, and Third Circuits and with different proportions of the 
trial sample for different years), the 1996-1999 data allow for a partial check on the 
results reported in the text. Our results for the second sample strongly confirm our 
finding of a very high level of accuracy for the AO's "judgment for" variable. 
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A 0  award Type of error-n (% of  errors) 
range Errors 
(in 1000s) Total n n (% of sample) Rounding Digit O the r  













200-9998 90 37 (41%) 13 (35%) 2 (5%) 31 (84%) 
9999 24 19 (79%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 19 (100%) 
TOTAL 307 125 (41%) 33 (26%) 3 (2%) 94 (76%) 
SOURCE:ICPSK 8429, supra note 1 ,  supplemented by PACER docket research. The 
rows group cases by the damages award recorded in the A 0  data set. The columns 
su~nmarize the rate and accuracy of the A 0  coding. 
award of $357,914 is coded as 360 (which should mean an award be- 
tween $359,500 and $360,499). While the amounts subject to round- 
ing error can be several thousand dollars or more, these are not errors 
that should greatly concern most analysts, because they are necessarily 
either small or small in relation to the actual award, and usually both. 
Digit errors, which we define to occur where an award is misstated in 
the A 0  data because of the need to input the amount in thousands of 
dollars, could pose a larger problem for research use of the A 0  data, 
but such errors are very rare in our tort trial sample. The final col- 
umn aggregates a variety of other kinds of errors: typos, partial 
awards, and so on. Some may well not be errors at all, but rather 
disagreements between the two data sources about the proper way to 
categorize different kinds of awards (e.g., prejudgment interest, 
costs). 
As discussed above, awards coded by the A 0  as zero in which 
plaintiffs are simultaneously coded as victors merit special mention. 
The dockets set out the amount of the judgment in sixty-one of the 
seventy-seven such cases. Table 2 shows that half of those awards were 
correctly coded; they were nearly all declaratory j ~ d g m e n t s . ~ ~  The 
79 The cases included meet the following criteria: They are coded by the A 0  as 
terminating after a trial, with a judgment for plaintiff or for both, and we were able to 
obtain actual award information for them. Additional award errors, not presented in 
Table 2, stem from errors in the "judgment for" code-of the ten cases identified in 
Table 1's panel A as erroneously coded by the A 0  as defendants' victories, eight 
conlpounded the error with awards recorded as zero. 
80 Twenty-nine of the thirty were in related cases in which an insurance conlpany 
apparently successfully sought a declaratory judgment that the defendants did not 
have asbestosis. See, e.g,  Liberty Mut. Ins. Go. v. Carr, No. 97-125 (E.D. Tenn. filed 
Mar. 12, 1997); L.iberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Seabolt, No. 97-105 (E.D.Tenn. filed Mar. 12, 
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other half, incorrectly coded, consists of ordinary damage awards for 
plaintiffs, in varying (non-zero) amounts. (In addition, one of these 
cases was actually a defendant's victory.) 
Finally, the cases in which the award is coded 9999 prove to be of 
two types. As intended by the AO, in a portion of our sample (five of 
twenty-four cases), 9999 indicates awards of $9.999 million or more. 
But the large majority are not cases in which the award is too high for 
proper coding in the A 0  system, but are rather errors. 
Similar analysis can be applied to the sample of inmate cases 
from 1993, though the results are quite different. Table 3 groups the 
inmate cases by A 0  award range. 
A 0  award Type of error-n (% of errors) 
range Errors n 
(in 1000s) Total n (% of sample) Rounding Digit Other 


















TOTAL 122 35 (29%) 2 (6%) 18 (51%) 15 (43%) 
SOURCE: ICPSR 8429, supra note 1, supplemented by docket research. The rows 
group cases by the damages award recorded in the A 0  data set. The columns 
summarize the rate and accuracy of the A 0  coding. 
As for Table 2's tort sample, the errors in the inmate case sample 
are summarized in columns by error type. One thing Table 3 demon-
1997). The other case was a take-nothing plaintiffs' judgment, in which the jury 
found fault but no damages. 
81 The sample consists of all available inmate civil rights cases terminated in fiscal 
1993, with A 0  coding for a positive award for plaintiff or "both." Five cases are 
omitted because the docket sheet did not include relevant information; thirteen 
because no docket sheet could be obtained, and two because they were not inmate 
cases at all. 
82 According to their docket sheets, thirty-seven of the fifty-two cases in the first 
row have awards between $1 and $499, which, according to one of the directions the 
A 0  currently gives court personnel, should be coded with a zero award. For the 
reasons explained above, supra note 59, we think these cases are best considered as 
nonerrors, but we report them in this note for the sake of complete transparency. In 
addition, awards on the breakpoint of rounding (for example, $1500) are not treated 
as erroneous whichever way they are rounded (for example, coded as either "1" or 
"2"). 
83 Some case entries reported in this row have errors of multiple types and are 
therefore listed more than once. 
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strates is a meta-point we want to emphasize: the A 0  data can vary a 
great deal across case categories. Compared to tort cases, the errors 
in inmate cases have a quite different feel. Rounding errors are rarely 
present here, perhaps because the awards are lower (as the awards are 
meant to be coded in thousands, there is less rounding to do). In- 
stead, in this sample, a majority of errors are digit errors, which are 
common. These are likely to have a large impact on the accuracy of 
summary statistics from the A 0  data. 
Table 2's total error rate of 41%, and Table 3's total error rate of 
29%, each demonstrate that researchers' caution about errors in the 
AO's award data is merited. The absolute rate of error is high. But 
even a very high rate of error would not matter for most research pur- 
poses if errors are consistently small. And for some purposes, even 
large errors would not pose an obstacle to using the A 0  data if those 
errors were symmetrically distributed around zero (so that they would 
tend to cancel each other out). Thus we next consider the magnitude 
and distribution of errors. 
One way to assess the size of an error is as a percentage of the 
actual damage award. Using this approach for the torts sample, it 
turns out that although errors are often small (6%or less of the actual 
value for about a quarter of the errors), they are as often equal to 
loo%, and nearly as often quite large (200% or more of the actual 
value for about a fifth of the errors, and more than 1000% for one- 
tenth of the errors). The median error amount is 81%. This may 
overstate error magnitude, however: leaving out the anomalous cases 
in which the award is coded as zero (for which the error amounts are, 
of course, 100%)X4 the median error among cases with errors is just 
17%-quite small. 
For assessment of error direction as well as magnitude, it's useful 
to consider a simpler error index-the true amount minus the AO- 
coded amount. Using this error figure, at least in our torts sample, 
errors again have a non-normal distribution, several aspects of which 
are worth noting. First, small errors are the most prevalent. Among 
these small errors there is a slight overrepresentation of negative er- 
rors-A0 understatement of true awards. However, there are a fairly 
large number of very large errors, and these demonstrate substantial 
overrepresentation of positive errors-A0 overstatement of true 
awards. The 9999s and digit errors are the bulk but not all of these. 
Thc inmate sample looks somewhat different. Using either error 
index, about half the errors are quite small, but about half (the digit 
84 For the reasons discussed inJ1.anote 88 and accompanying text, omitting these 
cases seems unlikely to bias assessments of award amoilnts. 
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errors, mostly) are very large. And nearly all the errors are overstate- 
ment of true awards. 
All this is conceptually simple. A significant portion of the awards 
seem to be erroneously coded; the 9999 code only rarely means what 
it purports to and there are, depending on the case category, more or 
fewer rounding, "digit," and other errors. In the torts sample, the 
magnitude of errors tends to be small, but is often quite large, with 
most large errors overstating actual damages. In the inmate sample, 
nearly all of the errors overstate actual damages-half by a small 
amount, half by a large amount. What is far harder is to assess how 
much all this error matters for actual research uses, and whether there 
are methods by which researchers might work around errors to obtain 
useful information from the A 0  database. The next section moves to 
this issue. 
2. Research Implications of the A 0  Award Error Pattern 
Researchers have tended to use the A 0  data on award amounts in 
two distinct ways. Some users of the data-especially recent users- 
have been interested in modeling quite complex litigation dynamics. 
Such researchers explore, for example, the prevalence of settlement, 
and its relationship with other docket f e a t ~ r e s , ~ b r  the impact of 
demographic factors on award level~,~%r the decision to appeal and 
the outcome of the appellate process.87 For such uses, the devil may 
well be in the details. That is, whether the degree of error in award 
amounts undermines the A 0  data's ability to sustain this kind of re- 
search turns on the fine details of research design and model specifi- 
cation. All we can do here is offer a warning to such researchers to be 
aware of the issue and design their studies accordingly. 
85 See Fournier & Zuehlke, Out-ofcourt Settlements, supm note 8; Fournier & 
Zuehlke, Litigalion and Settlement, supra note 8. 
86 Helland & Tabarrok, supra note 5; Helland & Tabarrok, supm note 7. 
87 See, e.g., Clermont & Eisenberg, Dejindanls' Advantage, supm note 2;  Clermont 
& Eisenberg, Plainliphobin, s u p a  note 2 .  These two studies find that appellate courts 
reviewing tried cases tend to be more favorable to defendants than to plaintiffs. Cler- 
mont & Eisenberg, Plaintiphobin, SU@(L note 2, at 952. Appellate courts are more 
likely to reverse a trial victory for plaintiffs than for defendants. Id. But the studies 
me individual case data for award amount9 and therefore could be affected by the 
error patterns reported here. Re-running the analysis used in those studies with (1 ) 
9999 cases separately coded as such (award amounts in cases with awards of 9999 were 
treated by using a dummy variable), and (2) exclusion of 9999 cases, yields no mate- 
rial difference in results. In the models that treat 9999 cases separately, such cases are 
treated by using a dummy variable. The variable was not statistically significant in any 
of the models. 
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Other researchers use the A 0  data not for econometric model- 
ing, but for the light shed on the political economy of particular 
flavors of litigation. These scholars and policymakers seek, that is, to 
understand the central tendencies of particular portions of the fed- 
eral docket. The reliability problems reported above pose a more 
manageable challenge to this kind of work-one on which we may be 
able to make some progress in this Article. We next consider how 
such researchers might work around the A 0  award errors to obtain 
useful information from the A 0  database. To assess the overall impact 
of the errors, Table 4 reports on the mean tort awards in our 2000 tort 
sample, again as checked against dockets available from PACER; Ta- 
ble 5 looks at the distribution of awards, including the median; Tables 
6 a n d  7 present the corresponding data from the inmate sample. 
In comparing actual to AO-reported award levels, a preliminary 
decision must be made about what to compare with what. For our 
purposes, what seems most sensible is to compare the apparent uni-
verse of awards with the true universe of awards (rather than, as in 
Tables 3 and 4, comparing the A 0  values of some given set of cases 
with the PACER value of the same set of cases). More precisely, a 
researcher using just A 0  data to compute mean awards by case cate- 
gory or time period, for example, would, we believe, most reasonably 
proceed as follows: (1) limit the sample to cases in which a judgment 
was, according to the A 0  data, entered for plaintiff or for both plain- 
tiff and defendant, and (2) further limit the sample to those cases in 
which the coded award for plaintiff exceeded zero. The second limi- 
tation is based on the reasonable assumption that awards of zero in 
damage actions won by plaintiffs are rare-so that the zeros are either 
erroneous, signify missing data, or mark the cases as injunctive or de- 
claratory judgment cases rather than damage actions.88 To under- 
stand how much the error in the A 0  data matters, then, the most 
88 Prior to our work here, it might have been thought reasonable for some pur- 
poses to include zero awards in the mean computation on the ground that they are 
not known to be erroneous. Our work cautions strongly against this approach. More- 
over, at least as far as our torts sample indicates, leaving out plaintiffs' victories with 
AO-coded zero awards is unlikely to bias the result because, statistically comparing the 
actual awards from the anomalous zero-award cases to those from the larger non- 
anomalous portion of the docket, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the cases 
actually present observations from the same distribution. More specifically, one can- 
not reject the hypothesis that the medians of the two distributions are equal (the p- 
value for a Mann-Whitney test is .55); one cannot reject the hypothesis that the overall 
distributions are equivalent (the p-value of a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is .81); and 
one cannot reject the hypothesis that the means of log-transformed distributions are 
equal (the p-value for a T-test is .44 assuming equal variances and .48 not assuming 
equal variances). 
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useful comparison is between the results of the above reasonably con- 
stituted set of awards and the true set, comprising all the damage ac- 
tions in which plaintiffs are recorded in docket sheets as the victors, 
regardless of the victor or the level of award noted in the A 0  
database. This compares two slightly different sets of cases-but that 
is because the purpose is not to check the reliability of individual data 
points (an issue fully canvassed above) but rather to assess the impact 
of the errors on assessments of the distributional tendencies of 
awards. The tables following thus take this approach. 
a. Tort Awards 
95% 
confidence 
Mean intervals n 
1. True mean 816 452-1180 286 
2. A 0  mean, A 0  award > 0 (and true award found) 1387 1009-1765 246 
3. True mean of A 0  zero-awards 618 129-1108 40 
4. True mean of A 0  9999 awards 4717 696-8738 24 
5. A 0  mean, A 0  award > 0, excluding 9999 cases 456 317-595 222 
6. Replace only 9999 awards with true data 872 453-1290 246 
SOURCE:ICPSR 8429, szpra note 1, supplemented by PACER docket research. The 
first row shows the true mean award as determined by inspecting PACER dockets. 
The second and fifth rows show mean A 0  award codes. The third and fourth rows 
show true mean awards for cases for which the A 0  award code is "0" and "9999." 
The final row combines true and A 0  awards, replacing A 0  codes only for A 0  
awards coded 9999 and omitting A 0  awards coded zero. 
Table 4's first row sets out what we refer to as the "true" mean 
award in tried tort cases in the sample. That mean is based on the 286 
docket sheets in our tort trial sample whose dockets show judgments 
for plaintiffs, regardless of how the A 0  coded either the victor or the 
amount of the judgment. (We have omitted the non-damages plain- 
tiffs' judgments, discussed above, because including non-monetary 
cases obscures the true award pattern in the damage actions.) The 
row shows that the mean award for the full tort sample, as determined 
by inspecting the docket sheets via PACER, is approximately $816,000, 
with a 95% confidence interval of $452,000 to $1,180,000. In contrast, 
the table's second row shows that the mean award that a researcher 
looking only at the A 0  data (excluding AO-reported zero-awards) 
would report for a similar case population would be $1,387,000. The 
AO-based mean award is thus far higher than the more accurate mea- 
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sure-the error is $571,000 on a base of $816,000, or 70%.89 Table 
4's second numerical row also shows that the 95% confidence inter- 
vals for the two means overlap only ~lightly.~" 
Because we are interested in the influence of both zero and 9999 
awards on the AO-based mean, the table's next three rows explore 
these topics. We know from Table 2 that half of the zero and even 
more of the 9999 awards are erroneous. But how large is the resulting 
error in the estimate of the mean? Table 4's third row shows that the 
cases with zero judgments in which plaintiffs are coded as victors have 
a mean award, as reported on the docket sheets, of $618,000; the 
fourth row shows that the 9999 cases have a mean award, as reported 
on the docket sheets, of approximately $4.7 million. 
So, for researchers seeking to use the A 0  data in future analyses, 
both the zero and the 9999 awards seem to pose significant problems. 
One possible solution is simply to discard such awards. Table 4's fifth 
row tries out this approach, and shows that if both the zero and 9999 
awards are excluded, the mean award in the remaining part of the 
sample is $456,000. Thus, comparing an AO-based estimate to the 
true tort case mean of $816,000, the AO-based estimate shifts from 
substantially too high with the 9999 cases included to substantially too 
low if they (along with the zero cases) are omitted. The reason is 
clear: the AO-based mean is substantially too large because the 9999 
cases are not in fact on average awards of nearly $10 million or higher. 
Yet the mean calculated by excluding the 9999 cases is too low be- 
cause some of these cases' awards are correctly coded, and as a group 
they are therefore atypically high compared to the non-9999 cases. 
A second possible adjustment that continues to economize on 
case-by-case research could employ detailed, docket-sheet-based, inves- 
tigation only of the awards entered as 9999. Table 4's sixth row re- 
ports this calculation of the mean, based on replacing only the 9999 
awards with the true award, as reported on docket sheets. That is, the 
sixth row is based on 222 non-zero trial awards as reported in the A 0  
89 The alternative approach, which (as just stated, see supm note 88) we believe is 
conceptually flawed, would bc to compute the AO-based mean reported in the second 
row by including trials with zero awards. But this approach includes a fairly large 
number of cases known to be non-monctary declaratoryjudgments, see supm note 80, 
and an equal number of cases in which the zero-awards coded by the A 0  are known 
to be incorrect. In any event, this approach yields a sample of 308 awards to use in 
computing the AO-based mean, with a mean of $1.108 nlillion and a 95% confidence 
inte~val of $800,000 to $1.415 million. 
90 The difference between the means of the awards in the first two rows of Table 
4 is highly statistically significantly (/I c 0.0001). The difference persists even after a 
log transformation of award levels. 
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database, and twenty-four trial awards based on case-by-case inspection 
of cases whose awards are entered in the A 0  database as 9999. The 
mean award using this methodology is $872,000, reasonably close to 
the true tort-case mean of $816,000. On a percentage basis, the error 
is $56,000 out of $816,000, or 6.9%. Table 4 also shows that the 95% 
confidence intervals of the true mean and the 9999-replacement- 
based mean overlap nearly entirely. This second adjustment, then, is 
much more satisfactory than the first: the coding errors in the 222 
non-9999 cases are not so substantial as to yield a distorted mean 
when the 9999 cases are corrected. Moreover, the basic analysis holds 
in a second, smaller sample as well (although with a somewhat less 
accurate estimate of the mean), so it seems to be quite robust, at least 
for tort cases.Y1 
Table 5 continues the analysis but instead of mean awards reports 
percentiles, including the fiftieth percentile (the median). The initial 
distortion introduced by unquestioning use of A 0  data is substantially 
smaller than for the mean award. Table 5's first row shows the true 
median award to be $137,000. The second row shows the AO-based 
median to be $151,000, an error of $14,000 or 10.2% (of $137,000), 
compared to the 70% error in the AO-based mean. The error is in 
the expected direction-the A 0  data exceed the true median. Here, 
even without correction, aggregate statements about the A 0  data 
could be useful. The AO-based median is the right order of magni- 
tude; $151,000 does not "feel" dramatically different from $137,000- 
and is, in fact, within the 95% confidence interval of the true amount. 
A policy maker who acted on the basis of the A 0  figure for a general 
sense of award levels would not be too far off for many purpose^.^^ 
The effect of excluding the twenty-four 9999 awards is helpful, 
though less so than in the case of the mean. Table 5's third row 
91 Indeed, as to each point reported above, our results are similar in the second 
torts sample described previously. See szrpra note 78. The AO-based mean, $1.855 
niillion ( n  = 127), was very high compared to the true mean, observed by inspecting 
the docket sheets, which was $799,000 ( n  = l36),with this sinaller sample's seventeen 
9999 cases left in. The AO-based mean was very low-$430,000 ( n  = 206)with the 
9999 cases taken out-but approaching acceptable-$600,000 ( n  = 126) with docket- 
based corrections to the 9999 cases that could be found. The error rate of 24.5% 
from the true mean is substantially larger than the error achieved in the 2000 cases, 
but still supplies a more reasonable estimate of the mean award than do alternative 
methods. The higher error rate may be due to the ordinary random variation in the 
much smaller sample of cases, or to some nonrandom factor such as the small sample 
of districts. 
92 The 1996-1999 tort data, see supra note 78, confirm this general analysis. In 
that second tort sample, the AO-based median award is $186,000; the true median 
award is $134,000. 
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shows that excluding the twenty-four cases yields a median estimate of 
$125,000. The error is now $12,000 out of $137,000, a bit smaller 
than the error resulting from using the AO-based median, and, again, 
well within the 95% confidence interval of the true median award. 
SOURCE:ICPSK 8429, supra note I ,  supplemented by PACER docket research 
Shaded squares best fit with row 1's true data. 
Obviously, the AO-based median in row 2 is too high because 
only some of the 9999 cases are in fact awards in excess of $9 million. 
The twenty-four cases coded as 9999 in our sample actually have a 
median award of $998,000-substantially higher than the $125,000 
median of the non-9999 cases, but not nearly so high as the coded 
9999 figure suggests. The cases' relatively large awards also explain 
why Table 5's third row estimate-based on excluding only the 9999 
cases-is too low. Excluding such cases eliminates a set of observa- 
tions that are high relative. to the mass of cases, thereby artificially 
depressing the median derived from the non-excluded cases. 
Replacing only the 9999 awards with the true awards in such cases 
yields improvement for the median estimate. Table 5's fourth (and 
final) row shows that replacing only the 9999 awards produces a me- 
dian of $144,000. This is $7000 above the true median of $137,000, an 
error of 5.1%. This is yet more accurate than the 8.8%error obtained 
by excluding the 9999 cases. Indeed, across all percentiles, replacing 
the 9999 awards with their actual values gets the closest to the true 
distribution of awards; each box in the row is therefore shaded grey. 
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Both the point estimates and the confidence intervals in this row, 
across all five percentiles, are reasonable. 
But even though these best estimates depend on case-by-case in- 
spection of a number of dockets, the third row, which simply leaves 
out the 9999 cases, yields confidence intervals and point estimates that 
are quite reasonable for the tenth, twenty-fifth, fiftieth, and seventy- 
fifth percentiles. They are low only for the ninetieth percentile. In- 
deed, even the second row, which includes the 9999 cases, is fairly 
reasonable up to the median point. This suggests that researchers may 
be able to obtain a reasonable estimate of the median award without 
any docket-research. If one is interested in an upper-limit estimate, 
one could simply use the AO-based median (as in row 2) and be rea- 
sonably confident that the estimate is conservative (in the sense that 
the true median is unlikely to be substantially higher than the number 
so reported). So, for example, if one wishes to report an upper limit 
on the median tort awards in federal court for a year or other time 
period, the AO-based median seems reasonable to use. Similarly, if 
one is interested in a lower-limit estimate, excluding the 9999 cases, as 
in row 3, gives a reasonable figure. The excluded 9999 awards tend to 
drive up the median, as they do the mean. So in our sample, the 
$125,000 figure is a reasonable lower-bound point estimate of the me- 
dian award. 
b. Inmate Awards 
Table 6 reports on the mean awards in our 1993 inmate sample, 
again as checked against dockets available from PACER. Table 6's 
first row shows that the true mean for the inmate cases is $69,000. 
The A 0  data, used as published, yield a mean of $927,000." While 
the $858,000 error in the mean is bigger in absolute amount than the 
mean error for our tort sample, the more relevant and more damning 
statistic is that the error in the inmate case sample amounts to well 
over 1000% (the analogous figure for the tort sample was 70%).94 
93 There is one outlier award of over $6 million, correctly coded in the A 0  data 
set; if that award is taken out, the txue mean is only $16,403; the A 0  mean also comes 
down to $882,000. So, if anything, the text understates the degree of error. 
94 See supra note 88, and accompanying text. 
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95% 
confidence 
Amount intervals n 
1. True mean 69 -35-174 122 
2. A 0  mean 927 495-1360 122 
3. True mean of A 0  9999 awards 23 8-38 5 
4. A0 mean, excluding 9999 awards 540 257-822 117 
5. Replace only A 0 9999 awards with true mean 518 247-789 122 
6. A 0  mean, excluding 9999 awards mzd 199 35-364 117 
adjust digit errors 
Sounc~::ICPSR 8429, supm note 1 ,  supplemented by PACER docket research. The first row 
sho\vs the true meat1 arvarcl as determined by inspecting PACER tlockets. The second and 
fourth rows show mean A 0  ;\ward codes. The third row slrorvs true rnean awards for cases for 
which the A 0  awarcl code is "9999." T l ~ e  f0urt.h rorv coml,ines true and A 0  awards, replacing 
A 0  cotles for A 0  ;nvards coded 9999. The final row excludes all awards coded 9999 and 
;tc!justs all cligit errors. 
One hypothesis about the source of this large error is that inmate 
civil rights cases have an exceptionally high percentage of awards re- 
ported as 9999. This proves incorrect, however. As Table 6 shows, 
reported 9999 awards are just five of 122 cases (4.1%) with awards 
greater than zero in the 1993 ininate sample, compared to twenty-four 
of 246 (9.8%) in the analogous torts sample in Table 4. Moreover, in 
the full A 0  trial data set since 1991, which is described in Table 10 
below, awards coded 9999 account for only 2.5% of the inmate 
However, even though 9999 awards are not exceptionally fre- 
quent, the lower, true awards in inmate cases must be substantially 
more distorted by these erroneous large awards than are the larger 
awards in tort cases. Table 6's fifth row suggests that replacing the 
9999 awards with their actual values from docket sheets does go some 
portion of the way towards estiinating the true mean, though by no 
means far enough for most purposes. Replacing the five 9999 awards 
yields a mean estimate of $518,000, quite a bit closer to the real mean 
award of $69,000, though still dramatically higher. 
Table 6's final row demonstrates that there is another, even 
larger source of error-digit mistakes, which typically overstate awards 
by a factor of 1000 (when, say, a judgment of $112 is entered as 112, 
which is supposed LO mean $112,000). To obtain the statistics in the 
95 The diffet-cnce in 9999-awarcl rates between 1993 let-minations and the A 0  
data set as a whole is not statistically significant. 
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last row, we took each case in the inmate sample that had a digit error, 
and substituted the correct code for the award; we also excluded the 
9999 award cases." The result is a much better estimate of the true 
mean though still substantially incorrect. In sum, it seems likely that 
the real prevalence of small awards in the inmate sample not only 
amplifies the effect of the erroneous 9999 award entries but, more 
importantly, has a strong tendency to promote digit errors. (It makes 
intuitive sense that awards under $1000 are the most easily miscoded, 
because they do not have more digits than there are spaces in the data 
system.) 
The problem is that the correction in the final line of Table 6 
relies on the cumbersome process of reading many dockets, which is 
quite impracticable in many circumstances. So we move on to Table 
7, which examines the distribution of awards in the inmate sample, to 
see whether some other technique may be helpful in gleaning from 
the A 0  data a more accurate picture of the awards. 
Table 7 demonstrates that for the inmate cases, the very issue that 
introduces error-the extremely modest awards-also makes that er- 
ror matter less, if one is looking at and below the fiftieth percentile. 
The true median (in row 1) is just $950 (the tenth and twenty-fifth 
percentiles are smaller-so if they were rounded up, to match the A 0  
data's capabilities, they would be accurate). Using the medians in the 
next three rows in the table certainly does not eliminate the error, 
which is $4000 or about 400% if the comparison is to the A 0  data in 
its entirety (row 2) and $2000 or about 200% if the comparison drops 
the five 9999 awards (row 3). On the other hand, the importance of 
the error's magnitude depends on the research question being asked. 
It seems likely that $5000 or $3000 could be used almost interchange- 
ably with $950 in many discussions of inmate award issues. Indeed, 
the latter figure is not far off from the 95% confidence interval for the 
true number. A policymaker who acted on the basis of the A 0  figures 
for a general sense of award levels would not be far off. And the AO- 
based median would again provide a conservative upper bound esti- 
mate on the median inmate award. 
Thus, as in the case of the tort data, researchers, without the need 
for case-by-case inspection, can obtain a reasonable estimate of the 
median award. If one is interested in an upper-limit estimate, one 
could simply use the AO-based median and be reasonably confident 
that the estimate is conservative in the sense that the true median is 
96 If' only the digit errors are adjusted, and the 9999 cases remain in the sample, 
the resulting mean is 493, with a confidence in t end  between 124 and 862. This 
alone is a more significant improvement than simply exclitding the 9999 cases. 
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95% confidence intervals, by percentile 
(point estimates) 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
1 1. True data .001-.02 .025-.3 .5-2.5 5-23 27-102 
( n  = 122) (0.001) (0.10) (.95) (10) (47) 
2. A0 data: all (true 
award found) 
( 77, = 122) 
3. A0 data, 
excluding 9999 
cases ( n  = 117) 
4. Replace only 9999 
awards with true 
data ( n = 122) 
5. Adjust digit errors 
in A0 data 
( n  = 122) 
6. Exclude A0 9999 
awards and adjust 
digit errors 
(1) (1) (1) (12) (101) 
( n = 117) 
SOUKC:E:ICPSK 8429, supm note 1, supplemented by PACEK docket research. 
Shaded squares best tit with row 1's tnie data. 
unlikely to be higher than the $5000 so reported. Above the fiftieth 
percentile, however, the erroneous awards entirely dominate the sam- 
ple, and the A 0  data cannot itself do much to inform an estimate. 
For that, once again, researchers would need to read dockets. 
But how is one to know whether a given component of the A 0  
data is more like our torts sample, or more like our inmate case sam- 
ple, or unlike either? Again, the A 0  data itself may help to answer 
this question. We suggest above that the feature of the inmate cases 
that makes them error-prone is the low level of awards. Even though 
the A 0  data inflate the awards, they report a very large number of 
awards of "1": 52 of 122 (43%). This might be a potential tip-off in 
other case categories as well. We explore this issue briefly in Table 10, 
at the end of this Article; it turns out that there is no other category 
even close to inmate cases on this measure. 
3. Estimating Employment Discrimination Awards 
This section uses the information about award errors in the pre- 
ceding sections to estimate the level of awards in federal employment 
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discrimination trials. The sample consists of all tried federal employ- 
ment discrimination cases terminated from 1994 through 2000.Y7 We 
wish to estimate the true award levels in such cases without using the 
labor-intensive technique, employed above, of inspecting individual 
case docket sheets. To do so, we use, without modification, the AO- 
reported awards in all cases other than those in which the entry in the 
"amount" field is suspect because it is "9999." For those cases report- 
ing a 9999 award, we used PACER to inspect the actual docket sheets. 
Table 8 reports the results. 
I Estimated Estimated mean median n 
1. A 0  data ( n o  adjustment) 863 121 1298 
2. A 0  data (excluding 9999 awards) 295 107 1220 
3. Replace only A 0  9999 awards 301 110 1292 
4. T r u e  awards, 9999 cases only 410 170 70 
SOURCE:ICPSR 8429, supm note 1 (supplemented by PACER docket research of 
cases with 9999 awards). Each row shows the estimated mean and median trial 
award for the indicated data set. 
Table 8's first row shows the A 0  data's mean and median employ- 
ment discrimination awards-$863,000 and $121,000, respectively. 
Our analysis of tort awards suggests that the mean is likely substan- 
tially too high because it includes many awards reported to be $9.999 
million or higher that are in fact not so high. The second row of 
Table 8 reports what we expect to be low estimates of both mean and 
median, based on simply excluding the 9999 cases. Both figures turn 
out to be close to those computed in the third row, which is based on 
substituting the amount reported on the docket sheets for the seventy 
available cases with A 0  award codes of 9999. In this sample, simply 
excluding the 9999 cases yields mean and median estimates, $295,000 
and $107,000, that are not too different from those we obtained by 
97 More precisely, the sample is every case terminated between January 1, 1994 
and September 30, 2000, with an A 0  case code of 442, in which the procedural pro- 
gressis coded as after jury or judge trial and judgment is coded for plaintiff or for 
"both" plaintiff and defendant. 
98 Adjustments for inflation are based on BUREAUOF LABORSTATISTICS,U.S. 
DEP'YI..OF LABOR, PRICE ALLURBANCONSUMEKS(2003), available ntCONSUMER INDEX, 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.t (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). The 
true values of some 9999 cases are not available so the total number of A 0  cases in the 
table (1298) exceeds the sum of the number of 9999 cases and non-9999 cases. 
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the more laborious method of looking up the results in the seventy 
9999 cases, $301,000 and $110,000 (Of course, we cannot ascertain 
the true mean or median without inspecting all of the non-9999 cases, 
which we have not done.) Thus, in estimating the employment dis- 
crimination award mean, the technique of excluding the 9999 awards 
may itself yield a reasonable estimate. No case-by-case inspection of 
docket sheets may be required at all. 
Why are the 9999-excluded mean and the 9999-ascertained mean 
so much more similar in employment cases than in Table 4's tort cases 
or in Table 6's inmate cases? Two hypotheses are worth noting. First, 
the 9999 cases are a much smaller fraction of employment cases than 
of tort cases or inmate cases. Seventy of 1298 employment case awards 
(5.3%) have 9999 entered for the amount field. In Table 4's tort 
awards, the 9999 cases comprise twenty-four of 246 cases (9.8%). This 
difference is highly statistically significant ( p < .001). Second, the ab- 
solute level of docket-verified awards in the seventy 9999 employment 
discrimination cases is noticeably smaller than the level of docket-veri- 
fied awards in the twenty-four 9999 tort cases. In our torts sample, 
about a quarter of the 9999 cases are accurately coded (that is, had 
actual awards of $9.999 million or higher); taken together, the torts 
9999 cases have a docket-verified mean of $4,717,000-more than ten 
times the award level in non-9999 cases, reported in Table 4 to be 
$456,000. In the employment sample, by contrast, just one (1.3%) of 
the 9999 cases was accurately coded, and taken together, the 9999 
cases have a docket-verified mean of just $410,000 compared to the 
A 0  level of $295,000 for the non-9999 cases. Similarly, whereas the 
docket-verified median for our tort 9999 cases is nearly eight times 
greater than the docket-verified median for non-9999 cases, the true 
median of employment 9999 cases, $170,000, is just $63,000, or 
59.9%, above the non-9999 case median, as reported in the A 0  data. 
Thus the tort 9999 cases are a higher percentage of all cases, and 
they tend to have more extreme values than the employment discrimi- 
nation 9999 cases. The result: our finding above that exclusion of the 
tort 9999 cases more substantially affects both the mean and the me- 
dian than does exclusion of employment discritnination 9999 cases. 
The implications of our findings depend in part on whether re- 
searchers are interested in assessing win rates or award levels. We 
briefly explore both below, and then apply the techliiques developed 
here to estimate median trial awards for all large federal case 
categories. 
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A. Implications for Win-Rate Studies 
Generally-that is, where no other anornaly exists to counsel cau- 
tion-analyses using the AO's coding of which party obtained judg- 
ment are likely largely unaffected by errors in the A 0  data. Our 
evidence suggests that when the A 0  data show that judgment is en- 
tered for plaintiff or defendant (at least in cases coded with non-zero- 
awards) the reported victor is overwhelmingly accurate. In tried cases, 
moreover, relatively small fractions of the A 0  data report judgment 
codes other than for plaintiff or defendant. Still, for groups of cases 
that show substantial percentages of cases coded as judgment for both 
parties, such as our inmate case category, researchers should consider 
analyzing their data in the alternative: first without such cases and, 
second, with such cases treated as victories for plaintiffs. If the results 
of these alternative analyses are consistent with respect to the research 
question of interest, little basis for concern exists about possible inac- 
curacies in the judgment coding. If the results are not consistent, fur- 
ther consideration of how to deal with the ambiguous judgment code 
is necessary. In addition, as panel B-2 of Table 1 demonstrates, an 
anomaly, such as the miscoding of which party obtained judgment in 
cases coded with zero-awards, can render the "judgment for" data 
quite inaccurate, and needs to be accounted for with care. 
B. Implications for Sludies of Amounts 
With respect to award levels, our findings suggest that relying on 
unmodified A 0  trial data substantially overstates mean awards. Tables 
4 and 6 establish this in the areas of tort and inmate cases. And Table 
8 suggests that this is the case in employment discrimination cases; 
checking just the cases with coded awards of 9999 establishes that the 
mean award derived from A 0  data is unreliable. 
Tables 5 and 7, however, suggest that relying on the A 0  data to 
study median awards is often reasonable, depending on the research 
question being addressed. And Table 8's check on employment data 
does not falsify this hypothesis. For tort cases, and perhaps for em- 
ployment discrimination cases, the error in using A 0  data seems to be 
within acceptable ranges for most purposes, and the error can be fur- 
ther reduced by the simple expedient of excluding awards coded as 
9999. For inmate cases, and presumably for other classes of cases with 
typically small awards, the percentage error in the median is high. 
But the absolute difference in dollars between the AO-based median 
and the true median is small, precisely because most awards are small. 
For studies that use award amounts in a more complex way -not 
looking at awards by case category, but rather performing more indi- 
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vidualized modeling or other analysis-we offer only a cautionary 
word. Whether the A 0  data are sufficiently reliable to support such 
research will depend on the precise details of the research design, and 
the issue requires close attention. 
C. Applications: Judgmen,t Patterns and Awards Patterns for A11 
Federal Case Categom'es 
We build on the results reported above to supply some possibly 
helpful information about the A 0  data for several case categories. We 
first report on the percentage of trials that the A 0  reports as ending 
in judgments for plaintiffs or both plaintiffs and defendants, but with 
zero-awards. This class of cases was especially troublesome for the in- 
mate civil rights class of cases, but much less troublesome for tort 
cases. We then supply an estimate of the median trial award for all 
sizeable case categories. 
1. Judgment Code Patterns 
We have suggested that the successful use of A 0  data depends on 
close attention to anomalies. In both torts and inmate civil rights liti- 
gation, purported plaintiffs' judgments with zero damages are anoma- 
lous. Table 9 presents data on this cautionary signal in other case 
categories, as well as on the size of the category of judgment for 
"both." The table shows the total number of trial outcomes, and the 
percentage of those outcomes ending in judgments entered in the A 0  
data as being for plaintiff or for both plaintiff and defendant. It is 
limited to those case categories with at least one hundred trials coded 
with judgments for plaintiff or "both" for years 1991-2000. The last 
column explores the percentage of the plaintiffs' judgments in which 
the damage award coded is zero. We exclude cases in which the A 0  
data's "nature of judgment" code indicates that the judgment is an 
injunction, a forfeiture or condemnation, a costs-only judgment, and 
so on, in contrast to a monetary judgment." That is, we intend the 
column to explore a possible data anomaly, not an ordinary non-mon- 
etary judgment.100 (Of course, for some of these case categories, 
99 lCPSR 8429, supm note 1. 
100 Four "nature of judgment" codes remain: "-8,"which codes missing informa- 
tion, "0," which codes "no monetary award," "I ,"which codes "monetary award only," 
and "2,"which codes "monetary award and other." In every case category, all or 
nearly all of cases that contribute to the potential anomaly we are highlighting-judg- 
ment for plaintiff or both combined with a zero award-have a nature of,judgment 
code of zero ("no monetary award"). This is the code typically used in conjunction 
with a defendant's victory. Since we know from our torts sample that many of the 
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plaintiffs' judgments with zero damages might be expected, rather 
than anomalous.) 
Case category 
Insurance (1 10) 
Marine (120) 
Miller Act (130) 
Negotiable Instruments (140) 
General Contract (190) 
Contract Product Liability (195) 
Land Condemnation (210) 
Foreclosure (220) 
Torts to Land (240) 
Other Real Property (290) 
Airplane (310) 
Assault, Libel, Slander (320) 
Federal Employers' Liab. (330) 
Marine (340) 
Motor Vehicle (350) 
Motor Vehicle Product Liab. (355) 
Other Personal Injury (360) 
Medical Malpractice (362) 
Product Liability (365) 
Asbestos (368) 
Fraud (370) 
Other Personal Prop. Damage (380) 
Property Damage Prod. Liab. (385) 
Antitrust (410) 
Bankruptcy Appeals (422) 
Bankruptcy Withdrawal (423) 
Other Civil Rights (440) 
Voting (441) 
Employment Discrim. (442) 
Accommodations (443) 
RICO (470) 
Habeas Corpus (530) 
Inmate Civil Rights (550, 555) 
Drug-Related Prop. Forfeiture (625) 
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cases with the anomalous 'tjudgment for plaintiff' (or both) and zero-award combina- 
tion are, nonetheless, actually plaintiffs' judgments with erroneous award codes, we 
conclude that, unforti~nately, the nature ofjuclgment code is unhelpful to our analy- 
sis here. 
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TABLE9, CONTINUED 
A 0  
award = 0, 
as % of 
Judgment Judgment victories for 
for for plaintiff or 
Case category n plaintiffs "both" "both" 
Fair L.abor Standards Act (710) 588 53% 5% 13% 
Labor/Mgt Relations (720) 235 49% 3% 29% 
Other Labor Litigation (790) 378 39% 3% 19% 
ERISA (791) 1077 45% 5% 21% 
Copyright (820) 342 68% 7% 17% 
Patent (830) 700 54% 9% 34% 
Trademark (840) 434 61% 9% 33% 
Securities, Commodities, Exch. (850) 323 53% 8% 17% 
Tax Sui& (870) 581 51% 6% 27% 
Other Statutory Actions (890) 1135 49% 6% 30% 
Environmental Matters (893) 200 56% 11% 28% 
SOURCE:ICPSK 8429, sufim note 1. The table includes all cases coded in the A 0  
data as terminating after trial with a judgment for plaintiff or defendant or both 
plaintiff and defendant. It excludes cases with judgments coded as missing; and 
cases coded as in-junctions, costs-only awards, and the like. 
Table 9 demonstrates that cases with plaintiffs' victories com- 
bined with awards coded as zero are most prominent in a few catego- 
ries, many of them cases of a type that rarely result in damages (for 
example, land condemnation, foreclosure, and habeas corpus). In 
these categories, the coillbination is not anomalous at all. In other 
categories, however, a high portion of such cases may well be a signal 
of erroneous coding. Unless our inmate case sample turns out 
(against our current belief) to be nonrepresentative of inmate cases, 
we know that a researcher who accepts the "judgment for" code at 
face value would overstate plaintiffs' success rate in that category. The 
same may be true for other case categories in which damage actions 
are prevalent, and nontrivial percentages of zero awards exist. Based, 
however, on the evidence from our torts sample, which seems likely to 
be more typical of the dataset as a whole, we suspect that in case cate- 
gories in which plaintiffs are more frequently successful, errors sig- 
naled by an anomalous zero-award will be found more often in the 
award coding than in the "judgment for" code. 
Table 9 also suggests that the influence ofjudgments entered as 
for "both" plaintiff and defendant varies by case category. Table 1 
shows such judgments as nearly always for plaintiffs. But Tables 1 and 
9 both indicate that the "both" code is a much higher fraction of pos- 
sible pro-plaintiff judgment codes in inmate civil rights cases than it is 
in other case categories-indeed, using Table 9's figures, "both" judg- 
ments constitute nearly a third of the total pro-plaintiff jodgrnen.ts for 
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the inmate case category, a rate that is nearly the highest in any sizea- 
ble case category. So, the systematic coding of some plaintiff wins as 
wins for both has a larger effect on accurately stating plaintiff win 
rates in inmate civil rights cases than in most classes of cases. 
2. Median Award Estimates and Rates of Suspicious Award Codes 
Given the general reasonableness of the median estimates in our 
two sampled case categories, we apply the foregoing analysis to a 
larger set of A 0  cases to provide interested researchers and policy- 
makers with likely-improved estimates of median awards across many 
case categories. Table 10's rows represent each A 0  case category 
(and its respective code value) for which at least fifty trials with judg- 
ments for plaintiffs were concluded with positive awards from fiscal 
years 1991 through 2000.10' The first numerical column in each row 
reports the median dollar award, in inflation-adjusted year 2000 dol- 
lars, as computed from the unaltered A 0  data. The second numerical 
column reports the number of verdicts used to compute that median 
award. The third numerical row adjusts the A 0  median by recomput- 
ing the median after excluding awards of 9999. The fourth numerical 
column shows the number of verdicts used in computing this adjusted 
median award. The fifth numerical column, computed from the sec- 
ond and fourth columns, shows the percent of verdicts for each case 
category that report an award of 9999. And the sixth numerical col- 
umn shows the percent of verdicts for each case category in which the 
award is coded "1." These low-award cases could be of special interest 
as a source of error because where awards in the hundreds and low 
101 More precisely, the sample consists of terminations in which the judgment was 
after a jury or judge trial that resulted in a judgment for the plaintiff with a positive 
award noted. Dollar amounts are adjusted using Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation 
data. See supra note 98. Table 1's finding that cases coded by the A 0 as judgment for 
"both" plaintiff and defendant are actually plaintiff victories suggests checking Table 
10's median results by including 'tjudgment for both" cases. We have done so and, in 
the large majority of case categories, including the "judgment for both" cases does not 
materially change the median. Table 30 excludes such cases because we do not as- 
sume that Table 1's pattern holds for every category. Moreover, including the "judg- 
ment for both" cases seems to us most suspect in case categories in which including 
them generates a large change in the medians. In these categories, the 'tjudgment for 
both" cases are most dissimilar in amounts from cases coded as plaintiff judgment?, 
the proportion of "judgment for both" cases is especially high, or both the amounts 
and proportion are unusual. Either of these features may indicate, for a particular 
case code, that cases coded as "judgment for both" differ systematically from plain- 
tiffs' victories: perhaps they err by more than simply incorrectly coding which party 
won, or perhaps they constitute a conceptually separate category of outcomes in some 
other way. 
'494 N O I ' R E  D A M E  L A M T  R E V I E W  [VOL. 78:5 
thousands are particularly prevalent, what we have called "digit error" 
is likely to abound. Kesearchers would do well to be particularly care- 
ful if their focus is on a case category with a high proportion of re- 
ported small awards. 
For example, using the A 0  data without modification, the prod- 
uct liability case category (code 365) shows a median award of 
$486,000 based on 437 plaintiffs' verdicts. Excluding the 9999 awards 
yields a median products award of $368,000 based on 385 verdicts. 
We now hypothesize that the $368,000 figure is closer to the true me- 
dian than is the $486,000 figure."'" 
The principal non-inmate civil rights categories, "Other Civil 
Rights" (code 440) and "Employment Discrimination" (code 442), 
have adjusted median awards of $78,000 and $116,000 respectively. 
Inmate civil rights cases, for which the A 0  data may be the least accu- 
rate (as a percentage of the true award), conform to the pattern of 
low awards suggested in Part 11's detailed analysis of 1993 inmate 
cases. The $6000 median estimate in Table 10 is probably too high in 
light of that discussion. 
Inmate civil rights cases also have by far the largest percentage of 
trials entered resulting in damages coded as "1" in the A 0  data. The 
39% rate is more than triple the rate in most categories. This high 
rate of such awards is consistent with Table 3's report that, in our 
inmate case sample, fifty-two of 122 awards (42.6%) are coded as "1." 
The many low-award cases in this much larger sample further support 
the suggestion that the impact of the error pattern in inmate civil 
rights cases is likely not typical of the impact of the error pattern in 
other classes of cases. 
One interesting implication of Table 10 is that even after defla- 
tion of awards by omission of the 9999 cases, the reported awards re- 
main substantially higher than awards in state court litigation.lo3 
102 Given interest in the size of awards, one noteworthy feature of Table 10 is that 
only three case categories, Asbestos, Antitrust, and Patent, have median awards 
greater than $1 n~illion,even using the probably inflated medians based on all the A 0  
awarcls, including the 9999 cases. The Antitrust and Patent categories have the high- 
est percentage of 9999 awarcls; these 9999 awards may, indeed, be more-than-typically 
accluate in these large-award ca~egories. The 9999 cases are not, however, contribut- 
ing much to the high award level for asbestos cases, which are a world unto the~n- 
selves. .See, e .6 ,  Deborah R. Hensler, As 7i'~neGoes 1Iy: Asbestos Litigation AJer Amchem 
nnrl Ortiz, 80 TEX.L. REV. 1899 (2002). 
103 Kg., Eisenberg et al., suj~rnnote 55, at 439. 
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Plaintiffs' 
verdicts with Excluding 
non-zero A 0  9999 
judgment awards % A 0  award = 
Median Median 
Case categoly (1000s) n (1000s) n 9999 
Insurance (1 10) 173 769 149 715 7.0% 1.7% 
Marine (120) 107 282 97 272 3.5% 1.8% 
Miller Act (130) 48 135 42 128 5.2% 0.7% 
Negotiable Instruments (140) 366 173 309 155 10.4% 1.7% 
General Contract (190) 238 2261 201 2066 8.6% 1.5% 
Contract Product Liability (195) 327 54 156 47 13.0% 0.02% 
Torts to Land (240) 161 61 148 59 3.3% 4.9% 
Other Real Property Actions (290) 98 68 76 63 7.4% 2.9% 
Airplane (31 0) 681 114 483 103 9.6% 2.6% 
Assault, Libel, Slander (320) 103 99 90 91 8.1% 4.0% 
Federal Employers' Liab. (330) 233 410 198 387 5.6% 1.2% 
Marine (340) 187 543 165 513 5.5% 1.5% 
Motor Vehicle (350) 113 1509 95 1418 6.0% 2.1% 
Motor Vehicle Prod. Liab. (355) 652 68 431 58 14.7% 1.5% 
Other Personal Injury (360) 109 1734 90 1619 6.6% 2.5% 
Medical Malpractice (362) 482 337 364 297 11.9% 0.9% 
Product Liability (365) 486 437 368 385 11.9% 0.5% 
Asbestos (368) 3799 238 3793 236 0.8% 0.0% 
Fraud (370) 355 186 242 163 12.4% 2.2% 
Other Pers. Prop. Damage (380) 169 230 144 208 9.6% 3.9% 
Prop. Da~nage Prod. Liab. (385) 284 62 225 57 8.1% 3.2% 
Antitrust (410) 2823 65 1190 44 32.3% 0.0% 
Other Civil Rights (440) 99 1362 78 1262 7.3% 6.5% 
Employment Discrim. (442) 129 2186 116 2064 5.6% 1.7% 
Accommodations (443) 40 91 35 86 5.5% 4.4% 
RICO (470) 631 94 422 79 16.0% 0.0% 
Inmate Civil Rights (550, 555) 5 479 5 467 2.5% 39.0% 
Fair Labor Standards Act (710) 47 260 46 255 1.9% 5.8% 
Labor/Mgt Relations (720) 198 75 178 72 4.0% 2.7% 
Other Labor Litigation (790) 111 114 91 104 8.8% 4.4% 
ERISA (791) 60 364 53 350 3.8% 4.4% 
Copyright (820) 62 187 59 180 3.7% 5.9% 
Patent (830) 1694 250 625 194 22.4% 2.8% 
Trademark (840) 172 139 134 129 7.2% 4.3% 
Sec., Comm., Exchange (850) 547 130 357 118 9.2% 0.8% 
Tax Suits (870) 133 198 108 183 7.6% 6.6% 
Other Statutory Actions (890) 77 369 62 338 8.4% 5.1% 
Environmental Matters (893) 607 76 524 70 7.9% 1.3% 
SOURCE:ICPSR 8429, supra note 1. The table includes all cases coded in the A0  data as 
terminating with a judgment for plaintiff and a positive award amount in following a 
trial. 
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Subject to the limitations of our samples, we tentatively conclude 
that A 0  data can provide reasonably accurate estimates of the propor- 
tion of cases in which plaintiffs win damages judgments. A possible 
systematic understatement of plaintiff win rates exists that is attributa- 
ble to judgments recorded as judgments for "both" plaintiffs and de- 
fendants in fact tending to favor plaintiffs, but this outcome 
classification accounts for a small percentage of trial outcomes. 
With respect to awards, it is necessary to distinguish between 
mean and median awards. The error resulting from using unmodi- 
fied A 0  data to compute mean awards has a distinct direction in our 
two samples-the A 0  data systematically overestimate the mean 
award. Thus, studies that rely on A 0  data to address questions about 
the level of awards probably overstate amounts paid out in, for exam- 
ple, products liability litigati~n."'~ For case categories with fairly large 
awards, substantially improved mean-award estimates are likely obtain- 
able by substituting awards recorded on docket sheets for awards 
coded by the A 0  data as 9999. Estimates of median awards based on 
the A 0  data without further investigation appear to be of reasonable 
size and to provide useful upper bounds of true median awards. 
The A 0  database is likely to remain one of the major sources for 
civil justice research. We hope that this partial exploration of the ac- 
curacy of the data is helpful to other researchers, offering not only 
warnings but reasonably efficient solutions to identified accuracy 
problems. 
104 Eisenberg & Henderson, suprr~note 16, at '739. 
